

Heading South: U.S.-Mexico Trade And Job Displacement After NAFTA

Robert E. Scott

May 3, 2011

- *Supplemental Table A: Jobs displaced due to trade deficits with Mexico, by congressional district, 2010* [\[PDF\]](#) [\[Excel\]](#)
- *Supplemental Table B: Jobs displaced due to trade deficits with Mexico, by congressional district, 2010* [\[PDF\]](#) [\[Excel\]](#)


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As of 2010, U.S. trade deficits with Mexico totaling \$97.2 billion had displaced 682,900 U.S. jobs. Of those jobs, 116,400 are likely economy-wide job losses because they were displaced between 2007 and 2010, when the U.S. labor market was severely depressed.

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Abstract promises about increased jobs and exports misrepresent the real overall effects of trade on the U.S. economy. Trade both creates and destroys jobs. While exports tend to support domestic employment, imports lead to job displacement: As imports are substituted for domestically produced goods, production that supports domestic jobs falls, displacing existing jobs and preventing new job creation.

Growing trade deficits almost always result in growing trade-related job displacement. Like NAFTA, the KORUS FTA will likely result in growing trade deficits and hence U.S. job displacement, not economy-wide job growth.



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HEADING SOUTH U.S.-Mexico trade and job displacement after NAFTA

BY ROBERT E. SCOTT

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Key findings of this report include the following:


- The United States had a small (\$1.6 billion) trade surplus with Mexico (supporting 29,400 jobs) in 1993, the year before NAFTA took effect.
- U.S. trade deficits with Mexico as of 2010 displaced production that could have supported 682,900 U.S. jobs; given the pre-NAFTA trade surplus, all of those jobs have been lost or displaced since NAFTA. This estimate of 682,900 net jobs displaced takes into account the additional jobs created by exports to Mexico.
- Rapidly growing trade deficits and job displacement happened as a surge of foreign direct investment (FDI) poured into Mexico from private investors (NAFTA made it attractive to companies all over the world to invest in Mexico to gain duty free access to the U.S. market). FDI tripled as a share of Mexico's gross domestic product in the post-NAFTA period and fueled the outsourcing of jobs and production to Mexico.
- Most of the jobs displaced by trade with Mexico as of 2010 were in manufacturing industries (415,000 jobs; 60.8% of the total jobs displaced).
- Computer and electronic parts (150,300 jobs, 22% of the 682,900 displaced jobs) and motor vehicles and parts (108,000 jobs; 15.8% of the total) were the manufacturing industries hardest hit by growing bilateral trade deficits.
- More jobs were created in Mexico (30,400) by the growth of net exports of autos and auto parts to the United States in 2010 than were created in the entire U.S. auto industry in the same period, which added only 25,700 jobs between December 2009 and December 2010. The 30,400 jobs displaced in autos and parts in 2010 explains more than one-quarter of all jobs displaced by the growth of trade deficits with Mexico between 2007 and 2010 (116,400 jobs).
- The 682,900 jobs displaced as of 2010 were distributed across all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. The 10 hardest-hit states (i.e., jobs displaced as a share of total state employment) were Michigan (43,600 jobs lost, 1.0%), Indiana (24,400, 0.8%), Kentucky (12,100, 0.6%), Ohio (34,900, 0.6%), Tennessee (16,400, 0.6%), New Hampshire (4,000, 0.6%), Illinois (34,700, 0.6%), Alabama (11,100, 0.6%), Massachusetts (17,100, 0.5%), and Texas (55,600, 0.5%).
- The states with the most jobs displaced were California (86,500 jobs), Texas (55,600), Michigan (43,600), Ohio (34,900), Illinois (34,700), New York (34,300), Florida (28,800), Pennsylvania (26,300), Indiana (24,400), and North Carolina (18,900).
- The hardest-hit congressional districts, as a share of total employment, had large numbers of workers displaced by manufacturing trade, especially in autos, auto bodies, and parts, and in computer and electronic parts production. Half of the top 20 hardest-hit districts were in Michigan, followed by four in California, three in Indiana, two in Ohio, and one in Texas.
- U.S. trade with South Korea is similar to that with Mexico. This past decade, the United States has had significant trade deficits with South Korea that were dominated by trade in computer and electronic parts, and in motor vehicles and parts.
- Based on analyses of U.S. trade with both Mexico and South Korea and of the revisions to the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement made in December 2010, KORUS FTA is likely to increase U.S. trade deficits and job displacement, especially in the motor vehicles and parts and the computer and electronics parts industries.

The NAFTA model: Economic integration and deregulation hurt workers in Canada, Mexico, and the United States

The North American Free Trade Agreement eliminated or phased out most tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers between Canada, Mexico, and the United States. NAFTA was a 2,000-page treaty covering trade and regulation in a wide range of industries, and became, in effect, the economic constitution of North America.

Contrary to official predictions, NAFTA led to growing U.S. trade deficits with Canada and Mexico, not trade surpluses. The United States had a small trade surplus with Mexico in 1993, the year before NAFTA took effect. As shown in **Figure A**, by 2010, U.S. exports to Mexico totaled \$131.6 billion, but imports were \$228.8 billion, resulting in a \$97.2 billion U.S. trade deficit with Mexico in that year.¹

In NAFTA's first decade, the United States developed large trade deficits with Canada, especially in manufactured goods, which at their peak in 2004 displaced hundreds of thousands of U.S. jobs (Scott 2006). However, since 2002, the Canadian dollar has risen significantly against the U.S. dollar (as have other freely floating currencies, such as the Euro). As a result, the U.S. trade deficit with Canada in non-oil (primarily manufactured) goods largely disappeared, falling to less than \$1 billion in 2010. Therefore, U.S. trade with Canada in non-oil goods is no longer a significant source of job displacement for the United States.²



In addition to shifting trade balances, NAFTA altered the landscape for Mexican and Canadian workers. For example, prior to the implementation of NAFTA, Mexico had relatively high tariffs on industrial goods and agricultural commodities. It also maintained a “developmental state” which supported domestic development through an extensive set of regulatory policies that included local content regulations, requirements that foreign firms employ local managers, and other restrictions on the operations of multinational companies. Mexico also had a wide social safety net that included a public health insurance system and a system of rural property rights that supported subsistence farming and prevented agribusinesses from converting small plots to “industrial farms.”

NAFTA did much more than eliminate tariffs between both countries: It required Mexico (and Canada) to dismantle key components of their developmental states and also exerted great pressure on Mexico to pare back or privatize large parts of its safety net, as well as the national banking system. NAFTA included rules on trade in goods, technical barriers to trade, government procurement, investment, services, intellectual property rights, and administrative provisions, which included a “dispute settlement” process in the chapter on “Investment” (NAFTA Secretariat 2011, Chapter 11) that, for the first time, allowed corporations to sue governments for “takings” or the loss of potential profits as a result of new government regulations. The dispute settlement process has had a number of unintended consequences, and has resulted in at least 88 suits and \$327 million of settlements paid to foreign investors by governments in the region (Public Citizen 2010). These suits have also had a chilling effect on regulations in all three countries.³

NAFTA proponents claimed that the trade agreement would generate a growing middle class in Mexico. But their claims proved incorrect:

Contrary to NAFTA’s stated objectives, the Mexican economy has failed in its promised to create good quality jobs and to address the erratic and feeble growth of workers income. ... Employment has become increasingly precarious overall, the agricultural sector has suffered a large and steady loss of employment, and real salaries remain below the levels of the early 1990s, as Mexico’s dependence on global imports grows. (Salas 2006, 33)

In fact, NAFTA had devastating consequences for the Mexican economy (Salas 2006 and Faux 2006). Mexico experienced a peso crisis in 1994 that pitched the economy into a steep recession. At least one expert has argued that this crisis was caused, in part, by a wave of speculative foreign investment in Mexico in advance of the signing of the agreement (Blecker 1997). Millions of jobs were lost in the wake of the peso crisis (and the ensuing International Monetary Fund stabilization plan, which required massive, contractionary cutbacks in government spending).

NAFTA also provided convenient cover for conservative governments in all three nations to undertake economic reforms in order to gain economic “competitiveness” in the treaty’s wake. For example, Mexico also lost 1.3 million jobs in the agricultural sector as a result of the flood of cheap, subsidized corn from the United States after corn tariffs were liberalized, shortly after the agreement took effect (Papademetriou, Audley, Polaski, and Vaughan 2003, 1-23).⁴ Further, workers in Canada suffered as a result of massive cutbacks in government spending at the provincial and national levels that arose when conservative Canadian governments touting the need to maintain “competitiveness” used North American economic integration to begin a race to the bottom in government spending and taxation (Campbell 2006).

The effects of NAFTA on U.S. trade

NAFTA proponents, such as President Bill Clinton (1993) and Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott of the Institute for International Economics (1993) argued that the most important economic effects of the treaty would result from its tariff reductions, which would increase trade flows between member countries. These authors claimed that because tariff barriers were higher in Mexico than in the United States prior to NAFTA, U.S. exports to Mexico would grow much more rapidly than U.S. imports from Mexico after the agreement took effect. In this model, since U.S. tariff barriers were already quite low, the United States was giving away relatively little in trade concessions in exchange for access to a supposedly large and rapidly growing economic market, especially in Mexico. When NAFTA took effect, U.S.-Canada

economic integration was already established under the 1989 U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement and earlier trade agreements between the two countries.

Hufbauer and Schott (1993, 14-15) estimated that NAFTA would “create about 170,000 net new U.S. jobs in the foreseeable future...” based on projections of “a U.S. merchandise trade surplus with Mexico of \$7 billion to \$9 billion annually throughout the 1990s and perhaps \$9 billion to \$12 billion annually in the following decade.” Their estimates were relative to base-year trade in 1990, when the United States had a \$2 billion trade deficit with Mexico. A quick comparison of their forecast with the actual trade data shown in Figure A shows that these projections missed both the direction of trade flows (large U.S. trade deficits with Mexico, not surpluses, were the result), as well as their scale. The U.S. trade deficit in 2010 was nearly \$100 billion, roughly 10 times larger than the surplus predicted by Hufbauer and Schott in 1993.

As Figure A shows, the U.S. developed a trade deficit with Mexico shortly after NAFTA went into effect which continued to grow albeit with a temporary reversal from 2007, when the U.S. economy edged into recession, as demand for imports fell faster than demand for exports, to 2009, when U.S. imports from and exports to Mexico essentially collapsed as the U.S. economy fell into the worst recession in 75 years. The resulting decline in the U.S. trade deficit with Mexico (and other countries) between 2007 and 2009 helped cushion the impact of the recession on the U.S. economy, and transmitted part of the shock to Mexico and our other trading partners. In fact, Mexico’s economy contracted sharply in 2009, the peak year of the U.S. crisis, as real GDP declined by 6.5%.⁵

However, as depicted in **Table 1**, U.S. trade with Mexico recovered strongly enough in 2010 to push the U.S. trade deficit with Mexico to its nadir. In 2010, the deficit was up \$6.4 billion, in nominal terms, from 2007, reaching \$97.2 billion—reflecting a 14.6% average annual increase in the deficit from 1997 to 2010.

TABLE 1

U.S.-Mexico trade balance and job displacement, 1997–2010
U.S. trade with Mexico (\$billions, nominal)

	1997	2000	2007	2010	Changes in \$billions		Percent change
					1997–2010	2007–10	1997–2010
<i>U.S. domestic exports*</i>	\$68.4	\$100.4	\$119.4	\$131.6	\$63.2	\$12.2	92%
<i>U.S. imports for consumption</i>	85.0	134.7	210.2	228.8	143.8	18.7	169
<i>U.S. trade balance</i>	-16.6	-34.3	-90.8	-97.2	-80.6	-6.4	485
<i>Average annual change in the trade balance</i>					-6.2	-2.1	14.6

U.S.-Mexico trade-related jobs supported and displaced (thousands of jobs)

	1997	2000	2007	2010	Changes in thousands of jobs		Percent change
					1997–2010	2007–10	1997–2010
<i>U.S. domestic exports</i>	\$523.7	\$767.1	\$780.7	\$791.9	\$268.2	\$11.2	51%
<i>U.S. imports for consumption—jobs displaced</i>	626.3	966.7	1,347.2	1,474.8	848.5	127.6	135
<i>U.S. trade deficit—net jobs lost</i>	102.6	199.6	566.5	682.9	580.6	116.4	566


* Domestic exports are goods produced in the United States, and exclude re-exports, i.e., goods produced in other countries and shipped through the United States. Total exports as reported by the U.S. International Trade Commission include re-exports. Total exports were estimated to be \$163.3 billion in 2010, while U.S. re-exports to Mexico represent 19.4% of total exports. The employment estimates shown here are based on domestic exports only. See text and endnote 1 for further details and references.

SOURCE: EPI analysis of U.S. Census Bureau, United States International Trade Commission, and Bureau of Labor Statistics data.

Despite the U.S. experience with Mexico after NAFTA took effect, both Democratic and Republican administrations have continued to use the same arguments to predict that free trade agreements with other countries will lead to trade gains and new U.S. jobs. For example, in testimony before the U.S. Senate Finance Committee, U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk (2011) said, regarding the proposed U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, “It is time to realize this agreement’s promise of more than \$10 billion in increased goods exports and more than 70,000 American jobs.” This statement is cleverly crafted to ignore the likely impact of the agreement on U.S. imports—but the implied promise is clear: By cutting Korean tariffs and other market access barriers, the KORUS FTA will support job gains in the United States. However, as shown in this report, the United States experienced substantial net job displacement due to rising trade deficits with Mexico after NAFTA, and will likely suffer a similar result if the KORUS FTA is adopted (Scott 2010a).

Why NAFTA failed to improve the U.S. trade balance with Mexico

From the standpoint of the business community, NAFTA’s most important achievement was that it made Mexico a much safer and more attractive location to invest and outsource U.S. manufacturing production. NAFTA’s investment provisions created new and improved safeguards for foreign investors, including new dispute settlement tribunals providing a mechanism for settling disputes with foreign governments outside of the Mexican legal system.⁶ By eliminating Mexico’s developmental state and use of local content rules, and other demands and conditions on foreign investors, the trade agreement greatly reduced the cost of doing business in Mexico, and increased the security of those investments.



NAFTA's intellectual property provisions ensured that companies could retain complete control of their intellectual property. Finally, the services provisions opened up new markets for foreign investment in sectors formerly run by the state in Mexico, such as health care, banking, and transportation services.

For all these reasons, and because of the availability of a large, nearby pool of low-wage workers, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Mexico soared after NAFTA took effect. Between 1980 and 1993, FDI averaged only 1% of gross domestic product in Mexico. From 1994, when NAFTA took effect, until 2007, it nearly tripled, to 2.9% of GDP, as shown in **Figure B**.⁷ Those investments fueled a flood of outsourcing to Mexico. As a result, the average, annual rate of growth of imports from Mexico increased from 9.0% in the 1980–93 era to 11.7% in the post-NAFTA period (1994–2010).

The average annual rate of growth of exports to Mexico also increased, but much less, rising from 7.7% in the pre-NAFTA period to 8.3% post-NAFTA. The relatively slow export growth was caused, in part, by the peso crisis, which produced stagnating real wages in Mexico for at least a decade following NAFTA (Salas 2006; Papademetriou 2003). Stagnant wages limited consumption demand for exports from the United States. Parts, supplies, and components for use in Mexican export-oriented factories (so-called tourist exports) increased initially, but leveled off as Mexican supply chains (such as parts, engine, and stamping plants in the automotive sector) deepened and expanded.⁸

Since U.S. imports from Mexico grew much more rapidly than exports to Mexico after NAFTA, the trade deficit grew rapidly, as shown earlier in Figure A. Growing trade deficits usually result in trade-related job displacement and job losses, which was the case after NAFTA took effect, as shown below.

Employment impacts of U.S.-Mexico trade deficits

The United States had a small \$1.6 billion trade surplus with Mexico in 1993, the year before NAFTA took effect. By 1997, the United States had developed a \$16.6 billion trade deficit with Mexico, which increased to \$97.2 billion in 2010, as shown in Table 1. Between 1997 and 2010, the U.S. trade deficit with Mexico increased \$6.2 billion per year, or 14.6% per year.

This paper estimates the impact of that change in trade on employment by calculating the labor content of changes in the trade balance—the difference between exports and imports. For example, each \$1 billion in U.S. auto parts exported to Mexico supports U.S. jobs, but each \$1 billion in autos and trucks imported from Mexico displaces the workers who would have been making them in the United States. On balance, the net employment effect of trade flows is determined by changes in the trade balance. Growing trade deficits usually result in job displacement.

The employment impacts of trade deficits are assessed using an input-output model that estimates the direct and indirect labor requirements of producing output in a given domestic industry. The model includes 202 U.S. industries, 84 of which are in the manufacturing sector.⁹ The model estimates the amount of labor (number of jobs) required to produce a given volume of exports and the labor displaced when a given volume of imports is substituted for domestic output. The net of these two numbers is the estimated number of jobs displaced by changes in the trade balance, holding all else equal.

U.S. exports to Mexico in 2010 supported 791,900 jobs, but U.S. imports displaced production that would have supported 1,474,800 jobs, as shown in the bottom half of Table 1. Therefore, the \$97.2 billion U.S. trade deficit with Mexico in 2010 displaced 682,900 jobs.¹⁰ Since the United States had a small trade surplus in 1993 (not shown), all of those jobs were displaced between 1993 and 2010.¹¹ On average, 40,200 jobs have been lost or displaced per year since NAFTA took effect.¹²

U.S. jobs displaced by the trade deficit with Mexico are a net drain on employment in trade-related industries, especially those in the manufacturing sector. Even if increased demand in other sectors absorbs all the workers displaced by trade (an unlikely event), job quality is likely to suffer, as many non-trade-related industries, such as retail and home health care, pay lower wages and have less comprehensive benefits than trade-related industries.

Furthermore, the 116,400 U.S. jobs displaced by the \$6.4 billion increase in the deficit between 2007 and 2010 are counted as job losses because the U.S. labor market was in recession between 2007 and 2010. Since the U.S.-Mexico trade balance shrank in 2008 and 2009, all of these jobs were lost in 2010. Given the excess capacity in the economy in 2011, and the fact that short-term interest rates are close to zero, the 116,400 jobs displaced by trade since the recession began likely to be net job losses for the entire economy.

This loss of 116,400 jobs is large relative to the increase in the trade deficit between 2007 and 2010. It is explained, in part, by a decline in the deficit in crude oil and petroleum products, and a proportionately larger increase in the trade deficit in manufactured products (which are more labor intensive) in 2010 and by related changes in some price deflators. Falling prices for some manufactured goods expanded the real, non-oil trade deficit (dominated by trade in manufactured products), which increased about \$28 billion (versus the \$6.4 billion increase in the nominal deficit). There were large increases in the nominal trade deficit in a few manufactured goods (e.g., non-ferrous metal products, computer and peripheral products), which also experienced large price declines that magnified the impact of these shifts on real trade flows.

Trade deficits and job displacement, by industry

U.S. non-oil trade deficits, which are responsible for the bulk of all jobs displaced by NAFTA, are concentrated in a few key industries, especially computer and electronic parts and motor vehicles and parts. More than three-fourths of the U.S. trade deficit with Mexico in 2010 arose in these two industries. As a result, NAFTA-related job displacement is concentrated in these sectors, and in the regions of the country where they are located.

Table 2 summarizes U.S. trade with Mexico in 2010. Non-oil goods, which include everything in this table except for oil and gas mining and refined petroleum products, were responsible for 85.5% of total imports (column one in Table 2). Non-oil goods imports were dominated by manufacturing, which in turn was dominated by durable goods, which totaled \$163.1 billion, or 71.3% of total U.S. imports from Mexico.

While durable goods included a wide array of commodities, they were dominated by computer and electronic parts, which were responsible for \$53 billion (23.2%) of total imports; and by motor vehicles and parts, which were \$51.3 billion (22.4%) of total imports.

Compared with durable goods, non-durable goods (including food products, textiles, and apparel) made up a smaller share of manufactured imports: At \$13.8 billion, they were responsible for 6.0% of total imports. Imports of industrial supplies (including refined petroleum products) were \$14.1 billion (6.2%).

Non-oil goods were responsible for 89.4% of total exports (column 2). Manufactured products also dominated U.S. exports, but the composition was different from imports. Durable goods, while still the largest manufacturing sector, was responsible for only \$68.1 billion in exports in 2010, or 51.7% of the total.

Within the durable goods industries, the United States largely ships components to Mexico for final assembly, including \$11.7 billion in computer and electronic parts; while they account for 8.9% of total exports, computer and electronics exports are roughly one-fifth of the value of computer and electronics parts imports. Similarly, exports of motor vehicles and parts to Mexico totaled \$15.9 billion, accounting for 12.1% of total exports, but less than one-third of the value of motor vehicles and parts imports.

Within manufacturing, industrial supplies were responsible for \$41.6 billion (31.6%) of total U.S. exports to Mexico in 2010. This included \$17.6 billion in chemicals (13.4%) and \$11.9 billion in refined petroleum products (9.1%). While the United States is a large net importer of crude oil, it has exported growing volumes of refined petroleum products back to Mexico in recent years. The smallest category of manufacturing exports were non-durable goods (\$11.7 billion, 8.9% of the total), which were dominated by food and kindred products (\$7.6 billion) and textiles and fabrics (\$2.4 billion).

TABLE 2

Trade with Mexico, by industry (billions of dollars), 2010

Industry*	Imports		Exports		Trade balance	
	dollars	share	dollars	share	dollars	share
Agriculture, forestry, fisheries	\$7.5	3.3%	\$6.5	4.9%	-\$1.0	1.0%
Mining	29.6	12.9	2.6	2.0	-27.0	27.8
<i>Oil and gas</i>	29.3	12.8	2.0	1.5	-27.3	28.1
<i>Minerals and ores</i>	0.3	0.1	0.7	0.5	0.3	-0.3
Manufacturing	191.0	83.5	121.3	92.2	-69.7	71.7
<i>Non-durable goods</i>	13.8	6.0	11.7	8.9	-2.1	2.2
Food and kindred products	4.6	2.0	7.6	5.8	3.0	-3.1
Beverage and tobacco products	2.6	1.1	0.5	0.4	-2.1	2.1
Textiles and fabrics	0.5	0.2	2.4	1.8	1.9	-1.9
Textile mill products	0.7	0.3	0.3	0.2	-0.4	0.4
Apparel and accessories	3.7	1.6	0.5	0.4	-3.2	3.3
Leather and allied products	1.7	0.7	0.5	0.4	-1.2	1.3
<i>Industrial supplies</i>	14.1	6.2	41.6	31.6	27.5	-28.3
Wood products	0.1	0.1	0.5	0.4	0.3	-0.4
Paper	0.9	0.4	4.1	3.1	3.1	-3.2
Printed matter and related products	0.4	0.2	0.5	0.4	0.1	-0.1
Refined petroleum products	3.8	1.7	11.9	9.1	8.1	-8.3
Chemicals	3.8	1.7	17.6	13.4	13.8	-14.2
Plastics and rubber products	2.8	1.2	5.9	4.5	3.1	-3.2
Nonmetallic mineral products	2.1	0.9	1.0	0.8	-1.1	1.1
<i>Durable goods</i>	163.1	71.3	68.1	51.7	-95.1	97.8
Primary metals	9.7	4.2	6.9	5.3	-2.8	2.9
Fabricated metal products	5.3	2.3	5.3	4.0	0.0	0.0
Not specified metal industries	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Machinery, except electrical	11.8	5.2	11.4	8.6	-0.4	0.4
Computer and electronic parts	53.0	23.2	11.7	8.9	-41.3	42.5
<i>Computer and peripheral equipment</i>	13.6	5.9	2.3	1.7	-11.3	11.6
<i>Communications, audio and video equipment</i>	30.5	13.3	3.1	2.4	-27.4	28.1
<i>Navigational, measuring, electromedical, and control instruments</i>	5.1	2.2	2.0	1.6	-3.0	3.1
<i>Semiconductor and other electronic components & storage media</i>	3.9	1.7	4.3	3.2	0.3	-0.3
Electrical equipment, appliances, and components	16.3	7.1	6.2	4.7	-10.1	10.4
Transportation equipment	52.2	22.8	17.7	13.4	-34.5	35.5
<i>Motor vehicles and parts</i>	51.3	22.4	15.9	12.1	-35.4	36.4
<i>Aerospace product and parts</i>	0.7	0.3	1.4	1.1	0.7	-0.8
<i>Railroad, ship, and other transportation equipment</i>	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.2	-0.2
Furniture and fixtures	1.3	0.6	0.3	0.2	-1.0	1.0
Miscellaneous manufactured commodities	13.5	5.9	8.5	6.5	-5.0	5.1
Scrap and non-comparable imports	0.8	0.3	1.1	0.9	0.4	-0.4
SUBTOTAL, NON-OIL GOODS	\$195.7	85.5%	\$117.7	89.4%	-\$78.0	80.2%
TOTAL	\$228.8	100.0%	\$131.6	100.0%	-\$97.2	100.0%

* Excludes utilities, construction, and service sectors, which had no trade, and communications, which had less than \$0.1 billion in imports and exports.

SOURCE: EPI analysis of U.S. Census Bureau, United States International Trade Commission, and Bureau of Labor Statistics data.

The total U.S. trade deficit with Mexico in 2010 (Table 2, column three) was almost entirely explained by the deficit in durable goods (\$95.1 billion, 97.8%). Durable goods trade deficits in computers and electronic parts (\$41.3 billion, 42.5%) and motor vehicles and parts (\$35.4 billion, 36.4%) together explained more than three-fourths of the U.S. trade deficit with Mexico in 2010. In contrast, the United States had a much smaller trade deficit in non-durable goods (\$2.1 billion), which included trade surpluses in food and kindred products (\$3.0 billion) and textile and fabrics (\$1.9 billion).¹³ The United States also had trade surpluses in industrial supplies (\$27.5 billion), which included surpluses in refined petroleum (\$8.1 billion), chemicals (\$13.8 billion), and plastics (\$3.1 billion). Finally, the United States had a trade deficit of only \$1 billion (1%) in agricultural, forestry and fisheries products. Detailed trade data (not shown) reveal that the United States had a surplus of about \$4.5 billion in cash grains and oil seeds in 2010, which was more than offset by a \$5.5 billion deficit in vegetables, melons, fruits, and tree nuts.

The picture that emerges from Table 2 is that of an integrated North American economy, one in which the United States exports high volume, capital-intensive manufactured supplies (textiles, refined petroleum, chemicals, and plastics) and parts for durable products, and imports a much larger volume of manufactured goods, which is dominated by imports of finished autos and computers and electronic components. The U.S. trade deficit with Mexico in crude oil was offset in 2010 by the U.S. surplus in industrial supplies. Crude oil prices were relatively low in 2010, and increasing oil prices could shift the sign of this balance in the future, but the basic tradeoff is likely to persist.

Trade deficits were highly correlated with job displacement

Trade deficits were highly correlated with job displacement by industry, as shown in **Table 3**. The U.S. trade deficit with Mexico in 2010 displaced 415,000 manufacturing jobs, about three-fifths (60.8%) of the 682,900 displaced overall from 1994–2010.

Within manufacturing, the hardest-hit industry was computer and electronic parts—150,300 jobs displaced (22%). This sector included computer and peripheral equipment (27,600 jobs, 4.0%), communication and audio-video equipment (82,800, 12.1%), and semiconductors and components (24,900 jobs, 3.6%). In motor vehicles and parts, 108,000 jobs were displaced, 15.8% of the total. Other hard-hit sectors included apparel and accessories (22,100 jobs, 3.2%), fabricated metal products (39,200 jobs, 5.7%), and miscellaneous manufacturing (22,300 jobs, 3.3%).

Although they don't appear in commodity trade flows, several service industries that provided key inputs to traded goods production experienced substantial job displacement, including administrative and support services (50,500 jobs, 7.4%) and professional, scientific, and technical services (53,300 jobs, 7.8%).

The U.S. trade deficit with Mexico in motor vehicles and parts, in particular, grew very rapidly in 2010. In part, this reflects the depressed state of the U.S. auto industry in 2009, in the wake of the financial crisis and the collapse of GM and Chrysler. It also reflects decisions to close large numbers of GM and Chrysler assembly plants as part of their bankruptcy-restructuring plans. Meanwhile, GM, Chrysler, Ford, and foreign auto manufacturers continued to invest in new vehicle-assembly plants in Mexico, and in plants to manufacture major parts such as engines and transmissions (Scott 2009).

As a result of U.S.-based plant closures and new plant openings in Mexico, more jobs were created in Mexico in 2010 (30,400) by the growth of net exports of autos and parts to the United States than were created in the entire U.S. auto industry in the same period, which added only 25,700 jobs between December 2009 and December 2010.¹⁴ The growth in job displacement in autos and parts in 2010 explains more than one-quarter of all jobs displaced between 2007 and 2010 (116,400 in total; see Table 1).

TABLE 3

Net U.S. jobs created or displaced by trade with Mexico, by industry, 2010

	Industry total*	Industry share of total jobs displaced
Agriculture, forestry, fisheries	8,200	-1.2%
Mining	-21,000	3.1
<i>Oil and gas</i>	-17,600	2.6
<i>Minerals and ores</i>	-3,300	0.5
Utilities	-2,000	0.3
Construction	-11,100	1.6
Manufacturing	-415,000	60.8
<i>Nondurable goods</i>	-22,200	3.3
Food and kindred products	5,700	-0.8
Beverage and tobacco products	-3,600	0.5
Textiles and fabrics	6,400	-0.9
Textile mill products	-3,400	0.5
Apparel and accessories	-22,100	3.2
Leather and allied products	-5,200	0.8
<i>Industrial supplies</i>	3,200	-0.5
Wood products	-1,500	0.2
Paper	4,800	-0.7
Printed matter and related products	-2,500	0.4
Petroleum and coal products	1,700	-0.2
Chemicals	13,100	-1.9
Plastics and rubber products	-2,300	0.3
Nonmetallic mineral products	-10,000	1.5
<i>Durable goods</i>	-396,000	58.0
Primary metals	-22,900	3.4
Fabricated metal products	-39,200	5.7
Not specified metal industries	0	0.0
Machinery, except electrical	-7,200	1.1
Computer and electronic parts	-150,300	22.0
<i>Computer and peripheral equipment</i>	-27,600	4.0
<i>Communications, audio and video equipment</i>	-82,800	12.1
<i>Navigational, measuring, electromedical, and control instruments</i>	-14,900	2.2
<i>Semiconductor and other electronic components & magnetic and optical media production</i>	-24,900	3.6
Electrical equipment, appliances, and component	-38,600	5.7
Transportation equipment	-105,500	15.4
<i>Motor vehicles and parts</i>	-108,000	15.8
<i>Aerospace product and parts</i>	2,000	-0.3
<i>Railroad, ship, and other transportation equipment</i>	400	-0.1
Furniture and fixtures	-9,600	1.4
Miscellaneous manufactured commodities	-22,300	3.3
<i>Other manufacturing not specified</i>	0	0.0

cont. on page 12

TABLE 3 (CONTINUED)

Net U.S. jobs created or displaced by trade with Mexico, by industry, 2010

	Industry total*	Share of total jobs displaced
Wholesale and retail trade	0	0.0%
Transportation	-26,000	3.8
Information	-16,300	2.4
Finance and insurance	-14,800	2.2
Real estate and rental and leasing	-9,100	1.3
Professional, scientific, and technical services	-53,300	7.8
Management of companies and enterprises	-39,500	5.8
Administrative and support and waste management and remediation services	-50,500	7.4
Education services	-1,000	0.1
Health care and social assistance	-500	0.1
Arts, entertainment, and recreation	-4,600	0.7
Accommodation and food services	-12,900	1.9
Other services	-8,100	1.2
Government	-4,600	0.7
Scrap and noncomparable imports	0	0.0
TOTAL JOBS CREATED OR DISPLACED*	-682,900	100.0%

* Subcategory and category totals may not exactly add up due to rounding errors.

SOURCE: EPI analysis of U.S. Census Bureau, United States International Trade Commission, and Bureau of Labor Statistics data.

Trade deficits and job displacement, by state

U.S. trade deficits with Mexico in 2010 reduced demand for goods produced in every region of the United States and have led to job displacement in all 50 states and the District of Columbia, as shown in Tables 4A–4C and in Figure C. Jobs displaced due to this deficit exceeded 0.5% of total employment in states such as Michigan, Indiana, Kentucky, Ohio, Tennessee, New Hampshire, Illinois, and Alabama, as shown in **Table 4A** and **Figure C**. More than 86,000 jobs were displaced in California, more than 55,000 were displaced in Texas, more than 43,000 jobs were displaced in Michigan, and more than 30,000 jobs were displaced in Ohio, Illinois, and New York each, as shown in **Table 4B**. An alphabetical list of job losses by state is shown in **Table 4C**.

Figure C (and the companion interactive map posted on EPI's website on May 3, 2011, under *Economic Snapshots* and *Lastest Research*) shows that the effects of growing trade deficits with Mexico have been widely felt across the United States and that no area has been exempt from their impact. Job displacement has been concentrated in Midwestern states, which are heavily impacted by losses in the auto sector, and in states with high-tech industries, such as Texas and California.

Growing trade deficits with Mexico have clearly reduced domestic employment in traded goods industries, especially in the manufacturing sector, which has been hard hit by plant closings and job losses. Manufacturing workers displaced by trade have had a particularly difficult time securing comparable employment elsewhere in the economy. More than one-third of workers displaced from manufacturing dropped out of the labor force (Kletzer 2001, 101, Table D2), and average wages of those who found work elsewhere fell between 11% and 13%.


Some economists have argued that job loss numbers extrapolated from trade flows are uninformative because aggregate employment levels in the United States are set by a broad range of macroeconomic influences, not just by trade

flows. However, while the trade balance is but one of many variables affecting aggregate job creation, the employment impacts of trade identified in this paper can be interpreted as the “all else equal” effect of trade on domestic employment.

The Federal Reserve, for example, may decide to cut interest rates to make up for job losses stemming from deteriorating trade balances (or any other economic influence), leaving net employment unchanged. This, however, does not change the fact that trade deficits *by themselves* are a net drain on employment.

Further, even in the best-case scenario in which jobs displaced by trade flows are replaced on a one-to-one ratio by new jobs, the job numbers in this paper are a (conservative) measure of the involuntary job displacement caused by growing trade deficits and a potent indicator of imbalance in the U.S. labor market and wider economy. Economists may label it a wash when the loss of a hundred manufacturing jobs in Ohio or Pennsylvania is offset by the hiring of a hundred construction workers in Las Vegas, but in the real world these displacements often cause large income losses and even permanent damage to workers’ earning power (Bivens 2008b).

Lastly, it’s important to note that many of the mechanisms that help push back against employment losses from growing trade deficits are not operating in the current recession (or jobless recovery). In short, in today’s high-unemployment economy, jobs displaced due to trade deficits with Mexico are much more likely to be actual net, economy-wide losses, rather than just job reallocations.



In the United States, 24.8 million people were unemployed or underemployed as of February 2011 (Shierholz 2011). In this situation, jobs displaced clearly represent jobs lost. Even if jobs were gained in Nevada (as they were lost in Michigan, Indiana and other states in the industrial Midwest) as trade deficits with Mexico grew between 1993 and 2008, those jobs disappeared after the Great Recession of 2008-09. Nevada had the highest unemployment rate of any state, at 14.2%, in January 2011 (Economic Policy Institute 2011).

TABLE 4 A

Jobs displaced due to trade deficits with Mexico, by state, 2010
(ranked by share of total jobs displaced)

	Net jobs displaced	Total state employment**	Share of state employment		Net jobs displaced	Total state employment**	Share of state employment
<i>Michigan</i>	43,600	4,552,700	1.0%	<i>New Jersey</i>	16,800	4,212,200	0.4%
<i>Indiana</i>	24,400	3,000,700	0.8	<i>Vermont</i>	1,300	329,700	0.4
<i>Kentucky</i>	12,100	1,863,500	0.6	<i>Arizona</i>	10,800	2,756,400	0.4
<i>Ohio</i>	34,900	5,412,100	0.6	<i>New York</i>	34,300	8,954,600	0.4
<i>Tennessee</i>	16,400	2,778,500	0.6	<i>Maryland</i>	10,600	2,827,400	0.4
<i>New Hampshire</i>	4,000	694,200	0.6	<i>Wyoming</i>	1,000	268,800	0.4
<i>Illinois</i>	34,700	6,087,800	0.6	<i>Kansas</i>	5,100	1,380,000	0.4
<i>Alabama</i>	11,100	1,995,900	0.6	<i>New Mexico</i>	3,200	868,100	0.4
<i>Massachusetts</i>	17,100	3,241,300	0.5	<i>Washington</i>	10,800	3,051,500	0.4
<i>Texas</i>	55,600	10,602,400	0.5	<i>Florida</i>	28,800	8,204,700	0.4
<i>California</i>	86,500	16,565,000	0.5	<i>Virginia</i>	13,100	3,739,700	0.4
<i>Wisconsin</i>	14,500	2,849,100	0.5	<i>Idaho</i>	2,400	685,800	0.3
<i>Minnesota</i>	13,700	2,713,700	0.5	<i>Nebraska</i>	3,200	916,600	0.3
<i>Oregon</i>	8,700	1,764,400	0.5	<i>West Virginia</i>	2,600	753,200	0.3
<i>Oklahoma</i>	7,900	1,626,900	0.5	<i>Louisiana</i>	6,000	1,872,100	0.3
<i>Arkansas</i>	5,800	1,237,400	0.5	<i>Puerto Rico</i>	3,800	1,199,900	0.3
<i>Colorado</i>	11,300	2,424,500	0.5	<i>Nevada</i>	3,700	1,206,800	0.3
<i>North Carolina</i>	18,900	4,133,000	0.5	<i>North Dakota</i>	1,000	336,900	0.3
<i>Missouri</i>	12,600	2,774,000	0.5	<i>South Dakota</i>	1,200	407,600	0.3
<i>Pennsylvania</i>	26,300	5,825,400	0.5	<i>Delaware</i>	1,200	407,900	0.3
<i>Mississippi</i>	5,300	1,201,700	0.4	<i>District of Columbia</i>	800	286,400	0.3
<i>South Carolina</i>	8,600	1,950,800	0.4	<i>Alaska</i>	900	322,300	0.3
<i>Utah</i>	5,400	1,228,900	0.4	<i>Maine</i>	1,800	656,400	0.3
<i>Connecticut</i>	7,600	1,742,300	0.4	<i>Hawaii</i>	1,200	605,800	0.2
<i>Iowa</i>	6,500	1,530,400	0.4	<i>Montana</i>	900	464,900	0.2
<i>Georgia</i>	18,300	4,310,000	0.4	<i>United States plus Puerto Rico*</i>	682,900	141,348,700	0.5%
<i>Rhode Island</i>	2,100	526,500	0.4				

* Totals vary slightly due to rounding errors.

** Average state employment in 2005–07. Analysis based on pooled, three-year times series data from the U.S. Census American Community Survey, as described in Scott (2010b, Appendix).

SOURCE: EPI analysis of U.S. Census Bureau, United States International Trade Commission, and Bureau of Labor Statistics data.

TABLE 4B

**Jobs lost through imports, jobs gained through exports,
and net jobs displaced due to trade deficits with Mexico, by state, 2010**
(ranked by number of jobs displaced)

	Import jobs	Export jobs	Net job change		Import jobs	Export jobs	Net job change
<i>California</i>	-174,200	87,700	-86,500	<i>Connecticut</i>	-16,900	9,300	-7,600
<i>Texas</i>	-113,100	57,500	-55,600	<i>Iowa</i>	-17,400	10,800	-6,500
<i>Michigan</i>	-80,500	36,800	-43,600	<i>Louisiana</i>	-14,900	8,900	-6,000
<i>Ohio</i>	-75,100	40,200	-34,900	<i>Arkansas</i>	-14,500	8,600	-5,800
<i>Illinois</i>	-73,000	38,300	-34,700	<i>Utah</i>	-11,700	6,200	-5,400
<i>New York</i>	-71,100	36,700	-34,300	<i>Mississippi</i>	-12,400	7,100	-5,300
<i>Florida</i>	-60,300	31,500	-28,800	<i>Kansas</i>	-13,500	8,300	-5,100
<i>Pennsylvania</i>	-61,400	35,100	-26,300	<i>New Hampshire</i>	-8,200	4,100	-4,000
<i>Indiana</i>	-49,500	25,000	-24,400	<i>Puerto Rico</i>	-9,400	5,600	-3,800
<i>North Carolina</i>	-44,900	26,000	-18,900	<i>Nevada</i>	-8,000	4,200	-3,700
<i>Georgia</i>	-42,200	23,800	-18,300	<i>Nebraska</i>	-9,000	5,800	-3,200
<i>Massachusetts</i>	-33,700	16,600	-17,100	<i>New Mexico</i>	-6,900	3,600	-3,200
<i>New Jersey</i>	-36,800	20,000	-16,800	<i>West Virginia</i>	-6,500	3,800	-2,600
<i>Tennessee</i>	-35,100	18,600	-16,400	<i>Idaho</i>	-6,600	4,100	-2,400
<i>Wisconsin</i>	-37,200	22,700	-14,500	<i>Rhode Island</i>	-5,100	3,000	-2,100
<i>Minnesota</i>	-31,500	17,700	-13,700	<i>Maine</i>	-5,000	3,200	-1,800
<i>Virginia</i>	-30,000	16,800	-13,100	<i>Vermont</i>	-3,000	1,700	-1,300
<i>Missouri</i>	-28,600	15,900	-12,600	<i>Delaware</i>	-3,300	2,000	-1,200
<i>Kentucky</i>	-25,200	13,000	-12,100	<i>Hawaii</i>	-3,000	1,800	-1,200
<i>Colorado</i>	-22,600	11,200	-11,300	<i>South Dakota</i>	-3,900	2,700	-1,200
<i>Alabama</i>	-24,500	13,300	-11,100	<i>North Dakota</i>	-3,100	2,100	-1,000
<i>Arizona</i>	-22,800	11,900	-10,800	<i>Wyoming</i>	-2,500	1,400	-1,000
<i>Washington</i>	-26,400	15,500	-10,800	<i>Alaska</i>	-2,200	1,200	-900
<i>Maryland</i>	-20,900	10,300	-10,600	<i>Montana</i>	-3,200	2,200	-900
<i>Oregon</i>	-19,600	10,900	-8,700	<i>District of Columbia</i>	-1,700	800	-800
<i>South Carolina</i>	-22,500	13,900	-8,600				
<i>Oklahoma</i>	-17,700	9,800	-7,900	<i>United States plus Puerto Rico*</i>	-1,474,800	791,900	-682,900

* Totals vary slightly due to rounding errors.

** Average state employment in 2005–07. Analysis based on pooled, three-year times series data from the U.S. Census American Community Survey, as described in Scott (2010b, Appendix).

SOURCE: EPI analysis of U.S. Census Bureau, United States International Trade Commission, and Bureau of Labor Statistics data.

TABLE 4C

**Jobs lost through imports, jobs gained through exports,
and net jobs displaced due to trade deficits with Mexico, by state, 2010**
(ranked alphabetically)

	Import jobs	Export jobs	Net job change		Import jobs	Export jobs	Net job change
<i>Alabama</i>	-24,500	13,300	-11,100	<i>Nebraska</i>	-9,000	5,800	-3,200
<i>Alaska</i>	-2,200	1,200	-900	<i>Nevada</i>	-8,000	4,200	-3,700
<i>Arizona</i>	-22,800	11,900	-10,800	<i>New Hampshire</i>	-8,200	4,100	-4,000
<i>Arkansas</i>	-14,500	8,600	-5,800	<i>New Jersey</i>	-36,800	20,000	-16,800
<i>California</i>	-174,200	87,700	-86,500	<i>New Mexico</i>	-6,900	3,600	-3,200
<i>Colorado</i>	-22,600	11,200	-11,300	<i>New York</i>	-71,100	36,700	-34,300
<i>Connecticut</i>	-16,900	9,300	-7,600	<i>North Carolina</i>	-44,900	26,000	-18,900
<i>Delaware</i>	-3,300	2,000	-1,200	<i>North Dakota</i>	-3,100	2,100	-1,000
<i>District of Columbia</i>	-1,700	800	-800	<i>Ohio</i>	-75,100	40,200	-34,900
<i>Florida</i>	-60,300	31,500	-28,800	<i>Oklahoma</i>	-17,700	9,800	-7,900
<i>Georgia</i>	-42,200	23,800	-18,300	<i>Oregon</i>	-19,600	10,900	-8,700
<i>Hawaii</i>	-3,000	1,800	-1,200	<i>Pennsylvania</i>	-61,400	35,100	-26,300
<i>Idaho</i>	-6,600	4,100	-2,400	<i>Puerto Rico</i>	-9,400	5,600	-3,800
<i>Illinois</i>	-73,000	38,300	-34,700	<i>Rhode Island</i>	-5,100	3,000	-2,100
<i>Indiana</i>	-49,500	25,000	-24,400	<i>South Carolina</i>	-22,500	13,900	-8,600
<i>Iowa</i>	-17,400	10,800	-6,500	<i>South Dakota</i>	-3,900	2,700	-1,200
<i>Kansas</i>	-13,500	8,300	-5,100	<i>Tennessee</i>	-35,100	18,600	-16,400
<i>Kentucky</i>	-25,200	13,000	-12,100	<i>Texas</i>	-113,100	57,500	-55,600
<i>Louisiana</i>	-14,900	8,900	-6,000	<i>Utah</i>	-11,700	6,200	-5,400
<i>Maine</i>	-5,000	3,200	-1,800	<i>Vermont</i>	-3,000	1,700	-1,300
<i>Maryland</i>	-20,900	10,300	-10,600	<i>Virginia</i>	-30,000	16,800	-13,100
<i>Massachusetts</i>	-33,700	16,600	-17,100	<i>Washington</i>	-26,400	15,500	-10,800
<i>Michigan</i>	-80,500	36,800	-43,600	<i>West Virginia</i>	-6,500	3,800	-2,600
<i>Minnesota</i>	-31,500	17,700	-13,700	<i>Wisconsin</i>	-37,200	22,700	-14,500
<i>Mississippi</i>	-12,400	7,100	-5,300	<i>Wyoming</i>	-2,500	1,400	-1,000
<i>Missouri</i>	-28,600	15,900	-12,600				
<i>Montana</i>	-3,200	2,200	-900	<i>United States plus Puerto Rico*</i>	-1,474,800	791,900	-682,900

* Totals vary slightly due to rounding errors.

** Average state employment in 2005–07. Analysis based on pooled, three-year times series data from the U.S. Census American Community Survey, as described in Scott (2010b, Appendix).

SOURCE: EPI analysis of U.S. Census Bureau, United States International Trade Commission, and Bureau of Labor Statistics data.

Trade deficits and job displacement, by congressional district

This study also reports results of a new model¹⁵ which shows that growing trade deficits cost jobs in every congressional district, including the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico (data for 437 districts in all, shown in **Supplemental Tables A and B** posted online to accompany this report). Because the motor vehicles and parts and the computer, electronic equipment and parts industries experienced the largest growth in trade deficits with Mexico, the hardest-hit congressional districts were located in states where those industries had concentrated: Michigan (10 of the top 20 hardest-hit districts), California (4), Indiana (3), Ohio (2), and Texas (1)(see **Table 5**).

TABLE 5

Top 20 hardest-hit congressional districts, 2010 (ranked by share of jobs displaced)

<i>Rank</i>	<i>State</i>	<i>District</i>	<i>Jobs displaced</i>	<i>District employment</i>	<i>Share of district employment</i>
1	California	15	4,900	324,300	1.51%
2	Indiana	3	4,600	346,700	1.33
3	Michigan	11	4,500	352,600	1.28
4	California	14	4,000	320,600	1.25
5	Michigan	10	4,200	340,000	1.24
6	Michigan	9	4,000	328,500	1.22
7	California	16	3,500	303,600	1.15
8	Ohio	4	3,400	299,200	1.14
9	Michigan	12	3,300	297,800	1.11
10	Michigan	14	2,400	220,200	1.09
11	Michigan	5	2,900	269,300	1.08
12	Michigan	15	3,300	326,600	1.01
13	Texas	3	4,200	418,200	1.00
14	Ohio	5	3,100	311,200	1.00
15	Michigan	7	3,100	313,500	0.99
16	Indiana	2	3,100	314,500	0.99
17	California	13	3,000	313,800	0.96
18	Michigan	13	1,900	205,000	0.93
19	Indiana	6	2,800	307,600	0.91
20	Michigan	8	3,100	346,600	0.89

* Totals vary slightly due to rounding errors.

** Average congressional district employment in 2005–07. Analysis based on pooled, three-year times series data from the U.S. Census American Community Survey, as described in Scott (2010b, Appendix).

SOURCE: EPI analysis of U.S. Census Bureau, United States International Trade Commission, and Bureau of Labor Statistics data.

NAFTA and KORUS FTA compared

Proponents of the North American and U.S.-Korea free trade Agreements (NAFTA and KORUS FTA) have made similar claims about the expected benefits of both agreements. They have claimed that both will bring down substantial trade barriers in partner countries, and that both will generate substantial export growth and job creation. However, under most circumstances, trade with Korea will buck the trend under NAFTA and support net job growth only if the U.S. trade balance improves (if the growth of exports exceeds import growth).¹⁶

Mexico and South Korea are different countries, but there are striking similarities in U.S. trading patterns with both. The United States has maintained a significant trade deficit with South Korea for the past decade; in 2010 the largest deficits were in computer and electronic parts (\$11.8 billion), and in autos and parts (\$9.4 billion) (U.S. International Trade Commission, 2011).¹⁷ The largest U.S. trade deficits with Mexico were in these same two industries, as discussed earlier. The deficits in South Korea trade were partially offset by surpluses in food and agricultural products and industrial supplies, which were also offsetting surpluses in U.S. trade with Mexico after NAFTA.

There are, however, substantial differences between Mexico and South Korea. Wages in Mexico are much lower than in South Korea. Industrial production of export goods in Mexico is dominated by foreign-owned plants that were set up to outsource production from the United States, and for low-wage access to the U.S. market (in the case of foreign-owned assembly plants, such as the Volkswagen plants in Mexico). South Korea's industrial structure, on the other hand, is dominated by mammoth industrial conglomerates ("chaebols") and groups such as the Hyundai group, which manufactures Hyundai and Kia brand vehicles. Hyundai is rapidly expanding assembly of vehicles in the United States, but the vast majority of the parts (content) used in these units are imported. Hyundai opened a second U.S. assembly plant in 2010, and has announced plans for a third assembly plant in Canada. The share of auto parts in the U.S. vehicle and parts trade deficit with South Korea increased from 17% in 2009 to 30% in 2010, reflecting the rapid growth of parts imports for Hyundai's U.S. auto assembly plants.

The United States and South Korea agreed to modifications to the original KORUS agreement in December 2010 (Schott 2010). "Most of the changes affect bilateral trade in autos and light trucks; other minor changes involved pharmaceutical patents, U.S. pork exports, and U.S. Visas." In Schott's view, the economic impact of the new agreement "differs little from the old deal. Immediate tariff cuts [on autos and light trucks] have been deferred for a few years," and South Korea's regulatory policies have been relaxed slightly to open their market to U.S. vehicle exports.

According to Schott, these changes will "[p]robably not...make much of a difference..." in terms of the economic impacts of the agreement. He notes that "Korean automakers already are sourcing a greater share of their U.S. sales from U.S.-based assembly plants." Thus, they will circumvent the delayed phase-out of U.S. tariffs on Korean auto imports. Tariffs on U.S. auto parts imports from South Korea will be eliminated immediately once the agreement takes effect, which will encourage Hyundai to source more parts from South Korea. The deal also includes a special "duty drawback" provision that will allow Korean firms to import parts and components from other countries, and re-export them to the United States, while rebating and avoiding all import duties (both Korean and U.S.), if only 35% of the content of those parts originates in Korea. This will create a vast conduit for duty-free imports of parts with high levels of content from China. These parts could also penetrate U.S. domestic automaker supply chains, which could accelerate U.S. job displacement.¹⁸

Growing U.S.-Korea trade deficits are likely to displace an additional 159,000 U.S. jobs in the first seven years after the agreement takes effect (Scott 2010a), based on the terms of KORUS, as originally negotiated. Based on Schott's 2010 analysis, and the additional data reviewed here, that estimate is, if anything, likely to be conservative. Like NAFTA, the KORUS FTA is likely to result in growing U.S. trade deficits and job displacement, especially in the motor vehicles and parts and the computer and electronics parts industries.

Conclusion

The growing U.S. trade deficit with Mexico has displaced a large number of jobs in the United States and is a significant contributor to the current crisis in U.S. manufacturing, which lost 5.6 million jobs between 2000 and February 2011 (BLS 2011). U.S. trade with Mexico in 2010 cost 682,900 U.S. jobs, and three-fifths of the jobs displaced (415,000) were in the manufacturing sector.

NAFTA proponents claimed that falling tariffs would generate rapidly growing exports and a sustained and growing trade surplus with Mexico. In fact, the United States has experienced steadily growing trade deficits with Mexico. Despite this experience, proponents of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement have claimed that growing exports will support 70,000 U.S. jobs. The job displacement that arose from U.S. trade deficits with Mexico after NAFTA took effect provides powerful evidence that the KORUS FTA is likely to lead to growing U.S. trade deficits and job displacement.

—*The author thanks Nicholas Finio and Anna Turner for research assistance.*

Endnotes

1. The analyses in this report exclude transshipments of goods through the United States to Mexico because production and transshipment of goods made in other countries does not support productive employment in the United States. Only goods domestically produced and consumed in U. S. trade with Mexico—usually referred to in official U.S. trade statistics as “domestic exports”—are reported in Figure A. Comparable imports are those that are for consumption. Trade statistics used in the analysis shown in Figure A were obtained from the United States International Trade Commission (USITC 2011). These data are compiled from the official trade statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce. The USITC (2010) likewise excludes transshipments from its analyses of the likely impacts of trade agreements, such as the proposed U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, basing its analyses instead on domestic exports and consumption imports. For example, the USITC (2010, 1-6 to 1-7) notes that “U.S. merchandise exports to Korea were valued at \$30.8 billion in 2006,” and that U.S. merchandise imports from Korea were valued at \$44.7 billion in 2006.” These data correspond precisely with U.S. domestic exports to Korea and U.S. imports for consumption, as reported by the USITC (2011). U.S. total goods exports to Korea were \$32.5 billion in 2006, nearly \$2 billion more than the value reported by USITC’s analysis of the “Potential Economy-wide and Selected Sectoral Effects” of KORUS FTA. Thus transshipments were excluded from that analysis. See also McArthur and Tucker (2010). Andriamananjara, Arce and Ferrantino (2004) of the U.S. International Trade Commission note that “Data representing transshipments or re-exports are almost always excluded from analytical portrayals of international trade...”
2. The United States had a trade deficit of \$68.6 billion in crude oil and refined products with Canada in 2010. U.S. production of these products has been in decline for some years, and development of alternatives (such as ethanol and electric cars) will require large investments and much time. Furthermore, crude oil production and refining are two of the least labor-intensive industries in the economy. Thus, imported oil and refined products now are essentially non-competing imports, and do not displace domestic production.
3. The National Association of Attorneys General (2002), representing 54 states and territories, passed a resolution expressing concern about the inclusion of measures such as dispute settlement provisions section of chapter 11, of NAFTA: “That provision has raised serious concerns over its impact on the power of government to act to protect health, welfare and the environment” (Spitzer 2002).
4. Under NAFTA, Mexico was allowed to phase out its corn tariffs over a 10-year period. However, it made a unilateral decision to eliminate all corn tariffs shortly after the agreement took effect. This allowed U.S. agribusiness firms to flood Mexico with cheap, subsidized U.S. corn and oil seeds, which made it difficult or impossible for subsistence farmers to survive.
5. The U.S. real GDP growth was 0.0% in 2008 and -2.6% in 2009. Thus, as is often said, when the U.S. economy gets a cold, Mexico gets pneumonia. Mexico is much more dependent on exports than the United States.
6. These tribunals, also known as investor state tribunals, are quasi-judicial bodies set up in the dispute settlement section of the investment chapter to hear complaints and issue binding awards of damages that can’t be appealed to any court.
7. FDI in Mexico fell in 2008 due to the impact of the recession. Information on FDI in 2009–10 was not available at the time of this report.
8. Both import and export growth surged dramatically in the first few years after NAFTA took effect: U.S. imports increased 22.2% per year between 1993 and 1997, while U.S. exports to Mexico increased 15.0% per year. After 1997 the growth rate of bilateral trade fell sharply: U.S. imports from Mexico increased 7.7% per year between 1997 and 2010, while the growth of exports to Mexico slowed to only 5.6% per year. The slowdown was likely caused by a combination of events including the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis; the rapid growth of Chinese exports, especially after China entered the World Trade Organization in 2001; and the U.S. recession of 2001, which led to a decade of slow growth in the United States and culminated in the financial crisis of 2008–09. These factors combined to increase competition for Mexican-based exporters, and to suppress or reduce U.S. demand for Mexico’s exports. The one constant in each of the post-NAFTA periods was that U.S. imports continued to grow more rapidly than exports, expanding the bilateral trade deficit.
9. See appendix of Scott (2010b) for a technical presentation and details on data sources used. This model has been completely updated and expanded for this study using new data on employment by state, industry, and congressional district from the American Community Survey, and data on employment requirements for 2008 and related economic data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2010, 2010a). Trade data collected by the U.S. Census Bureau were downloaded from the United States International Trade Commission (2011).
10. The jobs displaced by trade were also estimated using analysis based on macro-economic multipliers. In 2010, a 1 percentage-point decline in GDP reduced employment by 1.2 million jobs. U.S. GDP in 2010 was \$14.7 trillion, and the trade deficit with Mexico was \$97.2 billion, which equaled 0.663% of U.S. GDP. Multiplying .663 time 1.2 million yields 795,700 jobs, this is about 16.5% more than the 682,900 jobs estimated in Table 1. Thus, macroeconomic analysis largely confirms the input/output-based estimates in this report.
11. Scott (2006, Table 1) estimates that the U.S. trade surplus with Mexico supported 29,385 U.S. jobs in 1993.
12. Average annual jobs displaced were estimated by dividing the 682,900 jobs displaced as of 2010 by 17 years (1994-2010).
13. The U.S. also had significant trade deficits with Mexico in beverages, apparel, and leather products. The beverage deficit is a product, in part, of the fact that the U.S. still maintains quotas on sugar imports. Mexico is a major sugar producer and beverage imports contain large volumes of sugar and other sweeteners.
14. U.S. auto and parts exports to Mexico (NAICS 3361-63) increased \$4.7 billion between 2009 and 2010, but imports of these products increased \$17.3 billion, and the U.S. trade deficit in these products increased \$12.5 billion. The increased trade deficit, which was caused by the rapid growth of net imports from Mexico, was a stimulus to employment in the Mexican auto industry. The estimate of 30,400 net jobs created in Mexico is conservative because it is based on the U.S. jobs-to-trade ratios. Since wages are much lower in Mexico, more jobs would be supported there for each billion dollars in exports to the United States.
15. For further background on the EPI Congressional District/jobs model see Scott (2010b), including the appendix to that report.

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16. In theory, growing trade deficits with Korea could support small amounts of net job creation, but only if the U.S. specialized in exporting labor-intensive goods such as apparel to Korea, but that is highly unlikely. In 2009, the top four U.S. exports to Korea were semiconductors, basic chemicals, aerospace products, and oilseeds and grains. These are all capital-intensive goods that support relatively few jobs per million dollars of output.
 17. Analysis excludes transshipments, and includes only U.S. domestic exports and imports for consumption.
 18. The KORUS FTA revisions also included measures to reduce regulatory barriers to vehicle imports in Korea. One of these would allow each U.S. automaker to sell up to 25,000 vehicles per year in South Korea if they meet U.S. safety standards (each currently sells fewer than 5,000 units per year). Frequently changing and capricious Korean auto safety standards have been a barrier to U.S. vehicle exports. However, even if each U.S. automaker fills its quota under the new agreement, the growth in exports is likely to be swamped by the growth in the sales of imported and transplant-produced vehicles in the United States. Hyundai's U.S. sales increased from 735,000 units in 2009 to 894,000 units in 2010, an increase of 159,000 units or 21.7% (WardsAuto, 2011). Hyundai's 2010 U.S. sales grew faster than all but two other producers, both with much smaller market shares (Subaru, 264,000 units, an increase of 21.8%; and Porsche, 25,000 units, an increase of 28.6%). Total light vehicle sales (cars and light trucks) increased 11.1%, and sales of U.S.-based firms increased 13.3% in 2010, for comparison purposes.

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Heading South: U.S.-Mexico trade and job displacement after NAFTA

Supplemental Table A
Jobs displaced due to trade deficits with Mexico, by congressional district, 2010
 (ranked by share of jobs displaced)

Rank	State	Congressional district	Net jobs displaced	Total district employment**	Share of district employment
1	California	15	4,900	324,300	1.51%
2	Indiana	3	4,600	346,700	1.33%
3	Michigan	11	4,500	352,600	1.28%
4	California	14	4,000	320,600	1.25%
5	Michigan	10	4,200	340,000	1.24%
6	Michigan	9	4,000	328,500	1.22%
7	California	16	3,500	303,600	1.15%
8	Ohio	4	3,400	299,200	1.14%
9	Michigan	12	3,300	297,800	1.11%
10	Michigan	14	2,400	220,200	1.09%
11	Michigan	5	2,900	269,300	1.08%
12	Michigan	15	3,300	326,600	1.01%
13	Texas	3	4,200	418,200	1.00%
14	Ohio	5	3,100	311,200	1.00%
15	Michigan	7	3,100	313,500	0.99%
16	Indiana	2	3,100	314,500	0.99%
17	California	13	3,000	313,800	0.96%
18	Michigan	13	1,900	205,000	0.93%
19	Indiana	6	2,800	307,600	0.91%
20	Michigan	8	3,100	346,600	0.89%
21	Massachusetts	5	2,800	317,300	0.88%
22	Alabama	5	2,600	302,300	0.86%
23	Michigan	2	2,700	319,200	0.85%
24	Illinois	8	3,200	379,000	0.84%
25	Tennessee	6	2,800	346,700	0.81%
26	Indiana	5	3,100	389,500	0.80%
27	Kentucky	2	2,600	328,200	0.79%
28	Kentucky	6	2,800	357,100	0.78%
29	California	50	2,700	344,400	0.78%
30	Oregon	1	3,000	388,100	0.77%
31	Ohio	9	2,200	287,700	0.76%
32	Tennessee	4	2,100	275,100	0.76%
33	Ohio	17	2,100	278,800	0.75%
34	Illinois	6	2,600	346,000	0.75%
35	Illinois	10	2,300	309,900	0.74%
36	Texas	10	3,200	436,800	0.73%
37	Texas	12	2,600	358,300	0.73%
38	Indiana	9	2,400	335,700	0.71%

Heading South: U.S.-Mexico trade and job displacement after NAFTA

Supplemental Table A
Jobs displaced due to trade deficits with Mexico, by congressional district, 2010
 (ranked by share of jobs displaced)

Rank	State	Congressional district	Net jobs displaced	Total district employment**	Share of district employment
39	Texas	7	2,900	405,900	0.71%
40	Michigan	3	2,400	336,100	0.71%
41	Illinois	14	2,800	395,000	0.71%
42	Michigan	6	2,200	314,000	0.70%
43	Alabama	4	1,900	274,200	0.69%
44	Illinois	16	2,400	351,000	0.68%
45	Ohio	3	2,000	295,100	0.68%
46	Ohio	8	2,100	309,900	0.68%
47	Florida	15	2,300	343,500	0.67%
48	Minnesota	2	2,600	389,100	0.67%
49	Kentucky	1	1,900	285,400	0.67%
50	Texas	24	2,600	394,500	0.66%
51	Indiana	8	2,100	319,500	0.66%
52	Minnesota	3	2,300	350,200	0.66%
53	Indiana	4	2,400	365,800	0.66%
54	California	31	1,900	291,600	0.65%
55	Texas	31	2,200	338,100	0.65%
56	Massachusetts	3	2,100	322,800	0.65%
57	Texas	26	2,600	399,900	0.65%
58	Ohio	13	2,000	311,200	0.64%
59	Ohio	16	2,000	311,800	0.64%
60	Wisconsin	1	2,300	359,000	0.64%
61	North Carolina	10	1,900	300,900	0.63%
62	Indiana	1	2,000	317,800	0.63%
63	Illinois	13	2,400	389,600	0.62%
64	Wisconsin	5	2,300	373,600	0.62%
65	New York	29	1,900	311,700	0.61%
66	California	34	1,600	262,700	0.61%
67	California	32	1,700	281,600	0.60%
68	North Carolina	6	2,000	331,900	0.60%
69	California	11	2,100	349,400	0.60%
70	North Carolina	4	2,300	384,700	0.60%
71	Georgia	7	2,500	418,300	0.60%
72	Texas	32	2,000	335,600	0.60%
73	Texas	4	2,100	352,600	0.60%
74	California	47	1,700	285,800	0.59%
75	South Carolina	4	2,000	336,400	0.59%
76	Georgia	6	2,400	403,900	0.59%

Heading South: U.S.-Mexico trade and job displacement after NAFTA

Supplemental Table A
Jobs displaced due to trade deficits with Mexico, by congressional district, 2010
 (ranked by share of jobs displaced)

Rank	State	Congressional district	Net jobs displaced	Total district employment**	Share of district employment
77	Kentucky	3	1,900	324,900	0.58%
78	Ohio	10	1,700	292,000	0.58%
79	New Hampshire	2	2,000	344,100	0.58%
80	Texas	11	1,700	294,800	0.58%
81	Tennessee	2	1,900	331,000	0.57%
82	New Hampshire	1	2,000	350,000	0.57%
83	California	48	2,000	351,100	0.57%
84	Michigan	4	1,700	299,700	0.57%
85	New York	26	1,800	318,100	0.57%
86	Arkansas	3	2,000	353,500	0.57%
87	Wisconsin	6	2,000	354,800	0.56%
88	Tennessee	7	1,900	337,700	0.56%
89	California	40	1,800	320,500	0.56%
90	New Jersey	11	1,900	341,400	0.56%
91	Ohio	14	1,800	325,200	0.55%
92	California	53	1,700	307,200	0.55%
93	Colorado	2	2,100	380,400	0.55%
94	Ohio	7	1,700	308,100	0.55%
95	Massachusetts	6	1,800	327,400	0.55%
96	Tennessee	1	1,600	291,200	0.55%
97	Tennessee	5	1,900	346,600	0.55%
98	Oklahoma	1	1,900	347,100	0.55%
99	California	52	1,700	312,800	0.54%
100	California	37	1,500	277,400	0.54%
101	Minnesota	6	2,100	389,300	0.54%
102	Virginia	9	1,500	278,700	0.54%
103	Arkansas	1	1,500	278,900	0.54%
104	Arizona	6	2,300	430,200	0.53%
105	Illinois	5	1,900	355,400	0.53%
106	Massachusetts	2	1,700	318,400	0.53%
107	Kentucky	4	1,800	337,500	0.53%
108	Texas	16	1,400	262,700	0.53%
109	California	35	1,500	281,500	0.53%
110	Illinois	4	1,500	281,600	0.53%
111	California	38	1,500	282,300	0.53%
112	Illinois	11	1,900	358,900	0.53%
113	Mississippi	1	1,700	324,900	0.52%
114	Wisconsin	4	1,500	286,700	0.52%

Heading South: U.S.-Mexico trade and job displacement after NAFTA

Supplemental Table A
Jobs displaced due to trade deficits with Mexico, by congressional district, 2010
 (ranked by share of jobs displaced)

Rank	State	Congressional district	Net jobs displaced	Total district employment**	Share of district employment
115	Ohio	18	1,500	287,000	0.52%
116	California	46	1,700	325,600	0.52%
117	Pennsylvania	5	1,500	287,500	0.52%
118	Massachusetts	4	1,700	326,400	0.52%
119	Texas	6	1,900	365,300	0.52%
120	Pennsylvania	12	1,400	269,300	0.52%
121	California	28	1,600	308,400	0.52%
122	California	39	1,500	289,200	0.52%
123	Pennsylvania	4	1,600	309,200	0.52%
124	Ohio	15	1,700	329,000	0.52%
125	Connecticut	5	1,800	348,900	0.52%
126	Iowa	2	1,600	310,800	0.51%
127	Tennessee	8	1,400	273,200	0.51%
128	Pennsylvania	3	1,500	293,100	0.51%
129	Georgia	9	1,800	352,000	0.51%
130	Colorado	4	1,800	352,500	0.51%
131	California	42	1,700	333,300	0.51%
132	Alabama	3	1,400	274,800	0.51%
133	New York	25	1,600	316,500	0.51%
134	Texas	1	1,500	296,800	0.51%
135	Missouri	9	1,600	317,000	0.50%
136	Pennsylvania	18	1,600	319,300	0.50%
137	California	36	1,700	340,200	0.50%
138	Pennsylvania	15	1,700	341,800	0.50%
139	North Carolina	5	1,600	321,700	0.50%
140	Arizona	5	1,800	363,300	0.50%
141	Alabama	6	1,700	344,200	0.49%
142	Utah	1	2,000	405,100	0.49%
143	Texas	21	1,800	365,600	0.49%
144	California	24	1,600	325,200	0.49%
145	North Carolina	12	1,500	305,400	0.49%
146	Maryland	6	1,800	369,200	0.49%
147	Ohio	12	1,700	349,000	0.49%
148	Illinois	17	1,400	287,700	0.49%
149	Ohio	6	1,300	268,300	0.48%
150	California	12	1,600	330,900	0.48%
151	Texas	18	1,400	292,000	0.48%
152	Pennsylvania	16	1,600	334,000	0.48%

Heading South: U.S.-Mexico trade and job displacement after NAFTA

Supplemental Table A
Jobs displaced due to trade deficits with Mexico, by congressional district, 2010
 (ranked by share of jobs displaced)

Rank	State	Congressional district	Net jobs displaced	Total district employment**	Share of district employment
153	Minnesota	1	1,600	334,100	0.48%
154	Oklahoma	5	1,600	334,100	0.48%
155	Massachusetts	7	1,600	335,400	0.48%
156	Illinois	19	1,500	314,600	0.48%
157	Colorado	5	1,500	314,800	0.48%
158	Pennsylvania	6	1,700	356,800	0.48%
159	Texas	25	1,800	377,800	0.48%
160	California	44	1,800	378,200	0.48%
161	Illinois	9	1,500	315,500	0.48%
162	Colorado	6	1,900	399,700	0.48%
163	New York	27	1,400	294,700	0.48%
164	Pennsylvania	19	1,700	358,600	0.47%
165	Pennsylvania	8	1,600	339,800	0.47%
166	Ohio	2	1,500	319,100	0.47%
167	Florida	10	1,400	297,900	0.47%
168	California	6	1,500	319,500	0.47%
169	Oregon	3	1,700	362,300	0.47%
170	Texas	5	1,500	319,700	0.47%
171	Oklahoma	3	1,500	320,000	0.47%
172	Ohio	11	1,100	234,800	0.47%
173	California	49	1,500	320,900	0.47%
174	Minnesota	5	1,500	320,900	0.47%
175	Washington	8	1,800	385,600	0.47%
176	Illinois	15	1,500	321,400	0.47%
177	Texas	8	1,500	321,800	0.47%
178	California	8	1,600	343,900	0.47%
179	North Carolina	13	1,600	344,700	0.46%
180	Tennessee	3	1,400	302,100	0.46%
181	New York	28	1,200	259,300	0.46%
182	Indiana	7	1,400	302,700	0.46%
183	Pennsylvania	17	1,500	325,300	0.46%
184	Washington	1	1,700	368,900	0.46%
185	New York	2	1,500	325,800	0.46%
186	Wisconsin	3	1,700	371,500	0.46%
187	Georgia	3	1,600	350,800	0.46%
188	Connecticut	4	1,500	329,600	0.46%
189	Iowa	4	1,400	308,100	0.45%
190	Missouri	8	1,200	264,700	0.45%

Heading South: U.S.-Mexico trade and job displacement after NAFTA

Supplemental Table A
Jobs displaced due to trade deficits with Mexico, by congressional district, 2010
 (ranked by share of jobs displaced)

Rank	State	Congressional district	Net jobs displaced	Total district employment**	Share of district employment
191	Alabama	7	1,100	243,200	0.45%
192	Wisconsin	2	1,800	398,900	0.45%
193	Missouri	6	1,500	332,500	0.45%
194	Oklahoma	2	1,300	288,300	0.45%
195	Missouri	2	1,600	356,300	0.45%
196	Georgia	11	1,600	356,500	0.45%
197	California	29	1,400	312,700	0.45%
198	Illinois	7	1,200	268,800	0.45%
199	Mississippi	3	1,400	314,000	0.45%
200	Idaho	1	1,600	359,500	0.45%
201	Missouri	4	1,300	292,800	0.44%
202	Alabama	2	1,200	275,200	0.44%
203	Colorado	1	1,400	321,300	0.44%
204	Virginia	10	1,800	413,100	0.44%
205	Texas	9	1,400	322,900	0.43%
206	California	43	1,300	300,500	0.43%
207	Illinois	3	1,300	300,700	0.43%
208	Pennsylvania	9	1,300	301,000	0.43%
209	Oregon	4	1,400	325,000	0.43%
210	California	27	1,400	325,300	0.43%
211	North Carolina	2	1,300	304,100	0.43%
212	Massachusetts	9	1,400	327,700	0.43%
213	Illinois	2	1,100	258,000	0.43%
214	South Carolina	3	1,300	305,100	0.43%
215	Minnesota	4	1,300	305,200	0.43%
216	Connecticut	3	1,500	353,000	0.42%
217	California	33	1,300	308,300	0.42%
218	Louisiana	7	1,200	284,600	0.42%
219	Texas	22	1,700	403,300	0.42%
220	New Jersey	5	1,400	332,700	0.42%
221	New Jersey	12	1,400	333,100	0.42%
222	Florida	19	1,300	309,600	0.42%
223	California	26	1,400	334,400	0.42%
224	South Carolina	5	1,300	310,900	0.42%
225	Mississippi	2	1,100	263,100	0.42%
226	New Jersey	7	1,400	336,400	0.42%
227	Texas	30	1,200	288,700	0.42%
228	Oklahoma	4	1,400	337,100	0.42%

Heading South: U.S.-Mexico trade and job displacement after NAFTA

Supplemental Table A
Jobs displaced due to trade deficits with Mexico, by congressional district, 2010
 (ranked by share of jobs displaced)

Rank	State	Congressional district	Net jobs displaced	Total district employment**	Share of district employment
229	Kansas	3	1,600	386,400	0.41%
230	Florida	20	1,400	339,500	0.41%
231	California	30	1,400	339,600	0.41%
232	South Carolina	6	1,100	267,700	0.41%
233	California	9	1,200	292,400	0.41%
234	Maryland	8	1,500	366,200	0.41%
235	Georgia	13	1,500	367,200	0.41%
236	New York	22	1,300	319,300	0.41%
237	Iowa	1	1,200	295,000	0.41%
238	Missouri	3	1,300	319,600	0.41%
239	New Jersey	13	1,300	319,800	0.41%
240	New York	14	1,500	369,600	0.41%
241	Utah	3	1,700	419,100	0.41%
242	Washington	3	1,400	345,400	0.41%
243	North Carolina	8	1,200	296,300	0.40%
244	Connecticut	1	1,400	346,100	0.40%
245	Virginia	6	1,300	321,800	0.40%
246	Arizona	4	1,200	298,200	0.40%
247	Oregon	5	1,400	348,000	0.40%
248	Missouri	5	1,200	299,200	0.40%
249	Colorado	7	1,300	325,000	0.40%
250	West Virginia	2	1,100	275,500	0.40%
251	New York	12	1,200	300,900	0.40%
252	Missouri	7	1,300	326,200	0.40%
253	California	25	1,300	326,400	0.40%
254	Texas	29	1,100	276,200	0.40%
255	Utah	2	1,600	404,500	0.40%
256	North Carolina	11	1,200	303,900	0.39%
257	Vermont	Statewide	1,300	329,700	0.39%
258	New Jersey	6	1,300	329,900	0.39%
259	California	10	1,300	330,300	0.39%
260	New York	24	1,200	305,600	0.39%
261	New Jersey	8	1,200	306,200	0.39%
262	Kentucky	5	900	229,900	0.39%
263	Michigan	1	1,100	281,800	0.39%
264	California	23	1,200	308,800	0.39%
265	New York	19	1,300	335,100	0.39%
266	California	22	1,200	309,600	0.39%

Heading South: U.S.-Mexico trade and job displacement after NAFTA

Supplemental Table A
Jobs displaced due to trade deficits with Mexico, by congressional district, 2010
 (ranked by share of jobs displaced)

Rank	State	Congressional district	Net jobs displaced	Total district employment**	Share of district employment
267	New York	20	1,300	336,000	0.39%
268	New York	8	1,400	362,600	0.39%
269	Texas	2	1,300	336,700	0.39%
270	Rhode Island	1	1,000	259,500	0.39%
271	Pennsylvania	13	1,200	311,500	0.39%
272	Georgia	4	1,300	337,500	0.39%
273	Arizona	3	1,400	363,900	0.38%
274	Louisiana	4	1,000	261,500	0.38%
275	Washington	7	1,400	366,400	0.38%
276	Massachusetts	1	1,200	314,800	0.38%
277	Illinois	12	1,100	289,400	0.38%
278	New Mexico	3	1,100	289,400	0.38%
279	Tennessee	9	1,000	263,500	0.38%
280	Missouri	1	1,000	264,800	0.38%
281	North Carolina	9	1,500	398,300	0.38%
282	Texas	13	1,100	292,600	0.38%
283	Rhode Island	2	1,000	266,900	0.37%
284	Nebraska	1	1,200	320,400	0.37%
285	Florida	21	1,200	322,300	0.37%
286	Wyoming	Statewide	1,000	268,800	0.37%
287	California	7	1,100	296,100	0.37%
288	Georgia	5	1,200	323,100	0.37%
289	Pennsylvania	10	1,100	296,700	0.37%
290	Massachusetts	8	1,200	324,400	0.37%
291	California	4	1,300	351,500	0.37%
292	South Carolina	2	1,300	352,400	0.37%
293	Maryland	4	1,300	353,800	0.37%
294	Iowa	3	1,200	326,900	0.37%
295	Arkansas	4	1,000	272,500	0.37%
296	New Jersey	9	1,200	329,300	0.36%
297	New York	1	1,200	330,600	0.36%
298	California	3	1,300	358,900	0.36%
299	Arkansas	2	1,200	332,100	0.36%
300	Florida	22	1,200	332,400	0.36%
301	Illinois	1	900	250,000	0.36%
302	Florida	24	1,300	361,800	0.36%
303	Nebraska	2	1,100	308,400	0.36%
304	Kansas	2	1,200	336,700	0.36%

Heading South: U.S.-Mexico trade and job displacement after NAFTA

Supplemental Table A
Jobs displaced due to trade deficits with Mexico, by congressional district, 2010
 (ranked by share of jobs displaced)

Rank	State	Congressional district	Net jobs displaced	Total district employment**	Share of district employment
305	New York	3	1,100	310,600	0.35%
306	New York	5	1,100	310,800	0.35%
307	Maryland	2	1,200	339,800	0.35%
308	Washington	5	1,100	311,900	0.35%
309	Illinois	18	1,100	312,800	0.35%
310	Florida	13	1,100	313,300	0.35%
311	Florida	9	1,200	342,400	0.35%
312	Minnesota	7	1,100	314,100	0.35%
313	Nevada	2	1,300	373,400	0.35%
314	Texas	17	1,100	317,100	0.35%
315	Florida	11	1,100	318,200	0.35%
316	New York	18	1,100	318,400	0.35%
317	Wisconsin	7	1,200	347,900	0.34%
318	New Mexico	1	1,100	319,400	0.34%
319	South Carolina	1	1,300	377,700	0.34%
320	Florida	8	1,300	378,400	0.34%
321	Georgia	8	1,000	292,200	0.34%
322	Ohio	1	1,000	293,200	0.34%
323	Texas	28	1,000	293,500	0.34%
324	New Jersey	3	1,100	323,400	0.34%
325	Pennsylvania	14	900	265,700	0.34%
326	Maryland	7	1,000	295,300	0.34%
327	Pennsylvania	1	800	236,500	0.34%
328	New Jersey	1	1,100	325,500	0.34%
329	Massachusetts	10	1,100	325,700	0.34%
330	Louisiana	3	900	267,000	0.34%
331	Wisconsin	8	1,200	356,100	0.34%
332	Maryland	3	1,200	356,400	0.34%
333	Maryland	1	1,200	357,300	0.34%
334	Washington	9	1,100	328,500	0.33%
335	Florida	7	1,200	358,400	0.33%
336	Mississippi	4	1,000	299,100	0.33%
337	Virginia	11	1,300	389,700	0.33%
338	California	51	900	271,400	0.33%
339	Kansas	4	1,100	332,200	0.33%
340	Connecticut	2	1,200	364,200	0.33%
341	Texas	23	1,000	303,800	0.33%
342	California	45	1,100	335,000	0.33%

Heading South: U.S.-Mexico trade and job displacement after NAFTA

Supplemental Table A
Jobs displaced due to trade deficits with Mexico, by congressional district, 2010
 (ranked by share of jobs displaced)

Rank	State	Congressional district	Net jobs displaced	Total district employment**	Share of district employment
343	Pennsylvania	11	1,000	308,200	0.32%
344	Virginia	7	1,200	373,500	0.32%
345	Arizona	2	1,200	376,600	0.32%
346	New Jersey	10	900	282,900	0.32%
347	Puerto Rico	Statewide	3,800	1,199,900	0.32%
348	Florida	17	900	285,800	0.31%
349	Virginia	8	1,200	381,100	0.31%
350	New York	23	900	286,600	0.31%
351	California	19	1,000	318,700	0.31%
352	West Virginia	1	800	257,700	0.31%
353	New Mexico	2	800	258,700	0.31%
354	Texas	14	1,000	324,100	0.31%
355	Kansas	1	1,000	324,300	0.31%
356	California	17	900	295,500	0.30%
357	Colorado	3	1,000	330,100	0.30%
358	Virginia	5	900	297,400	0.30%
359	New Jersey	4	1,000	330,500	0.30%
360	California	5	900	297,700	0.30%
361	Pennsylvania	7	1,000	332,400	0.30%
362	Florida	23	900	299,400	0.30%
363	Florida	18	900	301,900	0.30%
364	New York	9	900	302,000	0.30%
365	North Dakota	Statewide	1,000	336,900	0.30%
366	South Dakota	Statewide	1,200	407,500	0.29%
367	Delaware	Statewide	1,200	407,900	0.29%
368	Florida	6	1,000	340,300	0.29%
369	Washington	2	1,000	340,400	0.29%
370	Texas	27	800	272,700	0.29%
371	Florida	4	1,000	341,200	0.29%
372	California	41	900	307,400	0.29%
373	Florida	5	1,000	341,900	0.29%
374	Georgia	10	900	307,900	0.29%
375	Minnesota	8	900	310,200	0.29%
376	New York	4	900	312,300	0.29%
377	New York	13	900	312,400	0.29%
378	Maine	1	1,000	348,800	0.29%
379	Georgia	2	700	245,100	0.29%
380	Arizona	7	900	316,300	0.28%

Heading South: U.S.-Mexico trade and job displacement after NAFTA

Supplemental Table A
Jobs displaced due to trade deficits with Mexico, by congressional district, 2010
 (ranked by share of jobs displaced)

Rank	State	Congressional district	Net jobs displaced	Total district employment**	Share of district employment
381	Alabama	1	800	281,500	0.28%
382	Maryland	5	1,100	388,200	0.28%
383	Nevada	3	1,300	458,800	0.28%
384	Arizona	8	900	318,400	0.28%
385	Virginia	1	1,000	356,700	0.28%
386	District of Columbia	District-wide	800	286,300	0.28%
387	Alaska	Statewide	900	322,200	0.28%
388	New York	15	800	286,600	0.28%
389	Nebraska	3	800	287,400	0.28%
390	New York	21	900	323,500	0.28%
391	Florida	3	800	288,200	0.28%
392	Florida	25	1,000	360,500	0.28%
393	Iowa	5	800	289,200	0.28%
394	Texas	19	800	291,000	0.27%
395	Texas	15	700	256,000	0.27%
396	West Virginia	3	600	219,600	0.27%
397	Louisiana	1	800	295,800	0.27%
398	New York	17	800	298,200	0.27%
399	Nevada	1	1,000	374,000	0.27%
400	New York	11	800	300,200	0.27%
401	Florida	12	900	340,000	0.26%
402	Oregon	2	900	340,400	0.26%
403	California	18	700	264,800	0.26%
404	Virginia	2	800	303,100	0.26%
405	New York	7	800	303,200	0.26%
406	New York	6	800	303,600	0.26%
407	Louisiana	2	500	193,700	0.26%
408	California	1	800	315,500	0.25%
409	Pennsylvania	2	600	237,200	0.25%
410	New Jersey	2	800	319,200	0.25%
411	North Carolina	1	600	243,100	0.25%
412	Texas	20	700	284,200	0.25%
413	Idaho	2	800	325,800	0.25%
414	Virginia	3	700	287,700	0.24%
415	Arizona	1	700	288,000	0.24%
416	North Carolina	3	700	290,500	0.24%
417	Virginia	4	800	335,200	0.24%
418	Washington	6	700	293,600	0.24%

Heading South: U.S.-Mexico trade and job displacement after NAFTA

Supplemental Table A
Jobs displaced due to trade deficits with Mexico, by congressional district, 2010
 (ranked by share of jobs displaced)

Rank	State	Congressional district	Net jobs displaced	Total district employment**	Share of district employment
419	Florida	1	700	293,800	0.24%
420	Louisiana	5	600	252,500	0.24%
421	California	21	700	300,400	0.23%
422	North Carolina	7	700	305,800	0.23%
423	Florida	14	800	351,000	0.23%
424	Maine	2	700	307,400	0.23%
425	New York	10	600	265,000	0.23%
426	Georgia	12	600	269,700	0.22%
427	Louisiana	6	700	316,100	0.22%
428	Florida	2	700	316,200	0.22%
429	Florida	16	700	323,100	0.22%
430	New York	16	500	230,900	0.22%
431	Georgia	1	600	284,100	0.21%
432	Hawaii	1	600	293,400	0.20%
433	California	2	600	294,900	0.20%
434	Montana	Statewide	900	464,800	0.19%
435	California	20	400	236,400	0.17%
436	Hawaii	2	500	311,800	0.16%
437	Washington	4	400	309,400	0.13%
	U.S. plus Puerto Rico*		682,900	141,348,700	0.48%

* Totals vary slightly due to rounding errors.

**Average employment by congressional district in 2005-07. Analysis based on pooled, three-year times series data from the U.S. Census American Community Survey, as described in Scott (2010b, Appendix).

Source: EPI analysis of U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. International Trade Commission, and Bureau of Labor Statistics data

Heading South: U.S.-Mexico trade and job displacement after NAFTA

Supplemental Table B
Jobs displaced due to trade deficits with Mexico, by congressional district, 2010
(sorted by state and congressional district)

State	Congressional district	Net jobs displaced	Total district employment**	Share of district employment
Alabama	1	800	281,500	0.28%
Alabama	2	1,200	275,200	0.44%
Alabama	3	1,400	274,800	0.51%
Alabama	4	1,900	274,200	0.69%
Alabama	5	2,600	302,300	0.86%
Alabama	6	1,700	344,200	0.49%
Alabama	7	1,100	243,200	0.45%
Alabama	Statewide	11,100	1,995,900	0.56%
Alaska	Statewide	900	322,200	0.28%
Arizona	1	700	288,000	0.24%
Arizona	2	1,200	376,600	0.32%
Arizona	3	1,400	363,900	0.38%
Arizona	4	1,200	298,200	0.40%
Arizona	5	1,800	363,300	0.50%
Arizona	6	2,300	430,200	0.53%
Arizona	7	900	316,300	0.28%
Arizona	8	900	318,400	0.28%
Arizona	Statewide	10,800	2,756,300	0.39%
Arkansas	1	1,500	278,900	0.54%
Arkansas	2	1,200	332,100	0.36%
Arkansas	3	2,000	353,500	0.57%
Arkansas	4	1,000	272,500	0.37%
Arkansas	Statewide	5,800	1,237,300	0.47%
California	1	800	315,500	0.25%
California	2	600	294,900	0.20%
California	3	1,300	358,900	0.36%
California	4	1,300	351,500	0.37%
California	5	900	297,700	0.30%
California	6	1,500	319,500	0.47%
California	7	1,100	296,100	0.37%
California	8	1,600	343,900	0.47%
California	9	1,200	292,400	0.41%
California	10	1,300	330,300	0.39%
California	11	2,100	349,400	0.60%
California	12	1,600	330,900	0.48%
California	13	3,000	313,800	0.96%
California	14	4,000	320,600	1.25%
California	15	4,900	324,300	1.51%

Heading South: U.S.-Mexico trade and job displacement after NAFTA

Supplemental Table B
Jobs displaced due to trade deficits with Mexico, by congressional district, 2010
 (sorted by state and congressional district)

State	Congressional district	Net jobs displaced	Total district employment**	Share of district employment
California	16	3,500	303,600	1.15%
California	17	900	295,500	0.30%
California	18	700	264,800	0.26%
California	19	1,000	318,700	0.31%
California	20	400	236,400	0.17%
California	21	700	300,400	0.23%
California	22	1,200	309,600	0.39%
California	23	1,200	308,800	0.39%
California	24	1,600	325,200	0.49%
California	25	1,300	326,400	0.40%
California	26	1,400	334,400	0.42%
California	27	1,400	325,300	0.43%
California	28	1,600	308,400	0.52%
California	29	1,400	312,700	0.45%
California	30	1,400	339,600	0.41%
California	31	1,900	291,600	0.65%
California	32	1,700	281,600	0.60%
California	33	1,300	308,300	0.42%
California	34	1,600	262,700	0.61%
California	35	1,500	281,500	0.53%
California	36	1,700	340,200	0.50%
California	37	1,500	277,400	0.54%
California	38	1,500	282,300	0.53%
California	39	1,500	289,200	0.52%
California	40	1,800	320,500	0.56%
California	41	900	307,400	0.29%
California	42	1,700	333,300	0.51%
California	43	1,300	300,500	0.43%
California	44	1,800	378,200	0.48%
California	45	1,100	335,000	0.33%
California	46	1,700	325,600	0.52%
California	47	1,700	285,800	0.59%
California	48	2,000	351,100	0.57%
California	49	1,500	320,900	0.47%
California	50	2,700	344,400	0.78%
California	51	900	271,400	0.33%
California	52	1,700	312,800	0.54%
California	53	1,700	307,200	0.55%

Heading South: U.S.-Mexico trade and job displacement after NAFTA

Supplemental Table B
Jobs displaced due to trade deficits with Mexico, by congressional district, 2010
(sorted by state and congressional district)

State	Congressional district	Net jobs displaced	Total district employment**	Share of district employment
California	Statewide	86,500	16,565,000	0.52%
Colorado	1	1,400	321,300	0.44%
Colorado	2	2,100	380,400	0.55%
Colorado	3	1,000	330,100	0.30%
Colorado	4	1,800	352,500	0.51%
Colorado	5	1,500	314,800	0.48%
Colorado	6	1,900	399,700	0.48%
Colorado	7	1,300	325,000	0.40%
Colorado	Statewide	11,300	2,424,500	0.47%
Connecticut	1	1,400	346,100	0.40%
Connecticut	2	1,200	364,200	0.33%
Connecticut	3	1,500	353,000	0.42%
Connecticut	4	1,500	329,600	0.46%
Connecticut	5	1,800	348,900	0.52%
Connecticut	Statewide	7,600	1,742,200	0.44%
Delaware	Statewide	1,200	407,900	0.29%
District of Columbia	district-wide	800	286,300	0.28%
Florida	1	700	293,800	0.24%
Florida	2	700	316,200	0.22%
Florida	3	800	288,200	0.28%
Florida	4	1,000	341,200	0.29%
Florida	5	1,000	341,900	0.29%
Florida	6	1,000	340,300	0.29%
Florida	7	1,200	358,400	0.33%
Florida	8	1,300	378,400	0.34%
Florida	9	1,200	342,400	0.35%
Florida	10	1,400	297,900	0.47%
Florida	11	1,100	318,200	0.35%
Florida	12	900	340,000	0.26%
Florida	13	1,100	313,300	0.35%
Florida	14	800	351,000	0.23%
Florida	15	2,300	343,500	0.67%
Florida	16	700	323,100	0.22%
Florida	17	900	285,800	0.31%
Florida	18	900	301,900	0.30%
Florida	19	1,300	309,600	0.42%
Florida	20	1,400	339,500	0.41%
Florida	21	1,200	322,300	0.37%

Heading South: U.S.-Mexico trade and job displacement after NAFTA

Supplemental Table B
Jobs displaced due to trade deficits with Mexico, by congressional district, 2010
(sorted by state and congressional district)

State	Congressional district	Net jobs displaced	Total district employment**	Share of district employment
Florida	22	1,200	332,400	0.36%
Florida	23	900	299,400	0.30%
Florida	24	1,300	361,800	0.36%
Florida	25	1,000	360,500	0.28%
Florida	Statewide	28,800	8,204,700	0.35%
Georgia	1	600	284,100	0.21%
Georgia	2	700	245,100	0.29%
Georgia	3	1,600	350,800	0.46%
Georgia	4	1,300	337,500	0.39%
Georgia	5	1,200	323,100	0.37%
Georgia	6	2,400	403,900	0.59%
Georgia	7	2,500	418,300	0.60%
Georgia	8	1,000	292,200	0.34%
Georgia	9	1,800	352,000	0.51%
Georgia	10	900	307,900	0.29%
Georgia	11	1,600	356,500	0.45%
Georgia	12	600	269,700	0.22%
Georgia	13	1,500	367,200	0.41%
Georgia	Statewide	18,300	4,309,900	0.42%
Hawaii	1	600	293,400	0.20%
Hawaii	2	500	311,800	0.16%
Hawaii	Statewide	1,200	605,700	0.20%
Idaho	1	1,600	359,500	0.45%
Idaho	2	800	325,800	0.25%
Idaho	Statewide	2,400	685,700	0.35%
Illinois	1	900	250,000	0.36%
Illinois	2	1,100	258,000	0.43%
Illinois	3	1,300	300,700	0.43%
Illinois	4	1,500	281,600	0.53%
Illinois	5	1,900	355,400	0.53%
Illinois	6	2,600	346,000	0.75%
Illinois	7	1,200	268,800	0.45%
Illinois	8	3,200	379,000	0.84%
Illinois	9	1,500	315,500	0.48%
Illinois	10	2,300	309,900	0.74%
Illinois	11	1,900	358,900	0.53%
Illinois	12	1,100	289,400	0.38%
Illinois	13	2,400	389,600	0.62%

Heading South: U.S.-Mexico trade and job displacement after NAFTA

Supplemental Table B
Jobs displaced due to trade deficits with Mexico, by congressional district, 2010
(sorted by state and congressional district)

State	Congressional district	Net jobs displaced	Total district employment**	Share of district employment
Illinois	14	2,800	395,000	0.71%
Illinois	15	1,500	321,400	0.47%
Illinois	16	2,400	351,000	0.68%
Illinois	17	1,400	287,700	0.49%
Illinois	18	1,100	312,800	0.35%
Illinois	19	1,500	314,600	0.48%
Illinois	Statewide	34,700	6,087,700	0.57%
Indiana	1	2,000	317,800	0.63%
Indiana	2	3,100	314,500	0.99%
Indiana	3	4,600	346,700	1.33%
Indiana	4	2,400	365,800	0.66%
Indiana	5	3,100	389,500	0.80%
Indiana	6	2,800	307,600	0.91%
Indiana	7	1,400	302,700	0.46%
Indiana	8	2,100	319,500	0.66%
Indiana	9	2,400	335,700	0.71%
Indiana	Statewide	24,400	3,000,700	0.81%
Iowa	1	1,200	295,000	0.41%
Iowa	2	1,600	310,800	0.51%
Iowa	3	1,200	326,900	0.37%
Iowa	4	1,400	308,100	0.45%
Iowa	5	800	289,200	0.28%
Iowa	Statewide	6,500	1,530,400	0.42%
Kansas	1	1,000	324,300	0.31%
Kansas	2	1,200	336,700	0.36%
Kansas	3	1,600	386,400	0.41%
Kansas	4	1,100	332,200	0.33%
Kansas	Statewide	5,100	1,380,000	0.37%
Kentucky	1	1,900	285,400	0.67%
Kentucky	2	2,600	328,200	0.79%
Kentucky	3	1,900	324,900	0.58%
Kentucky	4	1,800	337,500	0.53%
Kentucky	5	900	229,900	0.39%
Kentucky	6	2,800	357,100	0.78%
Kentucky	Statewide	12,100	1,863,500	0.65%
Louisiana	1	800	295,800	0.27%
Louisiana	2	500	193,700	0.26%
Louisiana	3	900	267,000	0.34%

Heading South: U.S.-Mexico trade and job displacement after NAFTA

Supplemental Table B
Jobs displaced due to trade deficits with Mexico, by congressional district, 2010
 (sorted by state and congressional district)

State	Congressional district	Net jobs displaced	Total district employment**	Share of district employment
Louisiana	4	1,000	261,500	0.38%
Louisiana	5	600	252,500	0.24%
Louisiana	6	700	316,100	0.22%
Louisiana	7	1,200	284,600	0.42%
Louisiana	Statewide	6,000	1,872,000	0.32%
Maine	1	1,000	348,800	0.29%
Maine	2	700	307,400	0.23%
Maine	Statewide	1,800	656,300	0.27%
Maryland	1	1,200	357,300	0.34%
Maryland	2	1,200	339,800	0.35%
Maryland	3	1,200	356,400	0.34%
Maryland	4	1,300	353,800	0.37%
Maryland	5	1,100	388,200	0.28%
Maryland	6	1,800	369,200	0.49%
Maryland	7	1,000	295,300	0.34%
Maryland	8	1,500	366,200	0.41%
Maryland	Statewide	10,600	2,827,300	0.37%
Massachusetts	1	1,200	314,800	0.38%
Massachusetts	2	1,700	318,400	0.53%
Massachusetts	3	2,100	322,800	0.65%
Massachusetts	4	1,700	326,400	0.52%
Massachusetts	5	2,800	317,300	0.88%
Massachusetts	6	1,800	327,400	0.55%
Massachusetts	7	1,600	335,400	0.48%
Massachusetts	8	1,200	324,400	0.37%
Massachusetts	9	1,400	327,700	0.43%
Massachusetts	10	1,100	325,700	0.34%
Massachusetts	Statewide	17,100	3,241,300	0.53%
Michigan	1	1,100	281,800	0.39%
Michigan	2	2,700	319,200	0.85%
Michigan	3	2,400	336,100	0.71%
Michigan	4	1,700	299,700	0.57%
Michigan	5	2,900	269,300	1.08%
Michigan	6	2,200	314,000	0.70%
Michigan	7	3,100	313,500	0.99%
Michigan	8	3,100	346,600	0.89%
Michigan	9	4,000	328,500	1.22%
Michigan	10	4,200	340,000	1.24%

Heading South: U.S.-Mexico trade and job displacement after NAFTA

Supplemental Table B
Jobs displaced due to trade deficits with Mexico, by congressional district, 2010
 (sorted by state and congressional district)

State	Congressional district	Net jobs displaced	Total district employment**	Share of district employment
Michigan	11	4,500	352,600	1.28%
Michigan	12	3,300	297,800	1.11%
Michigan	13	1,900	205,000	0.93%
Michigan	14	2,400	220,200	1.09%
Michigan	15	3,300	326,600	1.01%
Michigan	Statewide	43,600	4,552,600	0.96%
Minnesota	1	1,600	334,100	0.48%
Minnesota	2	2,600	389,100	0.67%
Minnesota	3	2,300	350,200	0.66%
Minnesota	4	1,300	305,200	0.43%
Minnesota	5	1,500	320,900	0.47%
Minnesota	6	2,100	389,300	0.54%
Minnesota	7	1,100	314,100	0.35%
Minnesota	8	900	310,200	0.29%
Minnesota	Statewide	13,700	2,713,700	0.50%
Mississippi	1	1,700	324,900	0.52%
Mississippi	2	1,100	263,100	0.42%
Mississippi	3	1,400	314,000	0.45%
Mississippi	4	1,000	299,100	0.33%
Mississippi	Statewide	5,300	1,201,600	0.44%
Missouri	1	1,000	264,800	0.38%
Missouri	2	1,600	356,300	0.45%
Missouri	3	1,300	319,600	0.41%
Missouri	4	1,300	292,800	0.44%
Missouri	5	1,200	299,200	0.40%
Missouri	6	1,500	332,500	0.45%
Missouri	7	1,300	326,200	0.40%
Missouri	8	1,200	264,700	0.45%
Missouri	9	1,600	317,000	0.50%
Missouri	Statewide	12,600	2,774,000	0.45%
Montana	Statewide	900	464,800	0.19%
Nebraska	1	1,200	320,400	0.37%
Nebraska	2	1,100	308,400	0.36%
Nebraska	3	800	287,400	0.28%
Nebraska	Statewide	3,200	916,500	0.35%
Nevada	1	1,000	374,000	0.27%
Nevada	2	1,300	373,400	0.35%
Nevada	3	1,300	458,800	0.28%

Heading South: U.S.-Mexico trade and job displacement after NAFTA

Supplemental Table B
Jobs displaced due to trade deficits with Mexico, by congressional district, 2010
 (sorted by state and congressional district)

State	Congressional district	Net jobs displaced	Total district employment**	Share of district employment
Nevada	Statewide	3,700	1,206,700	0.31%
New Hampshire	1	2,000	350,000	0.57%
New Hampshire	2	2,000	344,100	0.58%
New Hampshire	Statewide	4,000	694,200	0.58%
New Jersey	1	1,100	325,500	0.34%
New Jersey	2	800	319,200	0.25%
New Jersey	3	1,100	323,400	0.34%
New Jersey	4	1,000	330,500	0.30%
New Jersey	5	1,400	332,700	0.42%
New Jersey	6	1,300	329,900	0.39%
New Jersey	7	1,400	336,400	0.42%
New Jersey	8	1,200	306,200	0.39%
New Jersey	9	1,200	329,300	0.36%
New Jersey	10	900	282,900	0.32%
New Jersey	11	1,900	341,400	0.56%
New Jersey	12	1,400	333,100	0.42%
New Jersey	13	1,300	319,800	0.41%
New Jersey	Statewide	16,800	4,212,100	0.40%
New Mexico	1	1,100	319,400	0.34%
New Mexico	2	800	258,700	0.31%
New Mexico	3	1,100	289,400	0.38%
New Mexico	Statewide	3,200	868,000	0.37%
New York	1	1,200	330,600	0.36%
New York	2	1,500	325,800	0.46%
New York	3	1,100	310,600	0.35%
New York	4	900	312,300	0.29%
New York	5	1,100	310,800	0.35%
New York	6	800	303,600	0.26%
New York	7	800	303,200	0.26%
New York	8	1,400	362,600	0.39%
New York	9	900	302,000	0.30%
New York	10	600	265,000	0.23%
New York	11	800	300,200	0.27%
New York	12	1,200	300,900	0.40%
New York	13	900	312,400	0.29%
New York	14	1,500	369,600	0.41%
New York	15	800	286,600	0.28%
New York	16	500	230,900	0.22%

Heading South: U.S.-Mexico trade and job displacement after NAFTA

Supplemental Table B
Jobs displaced due to trade deficits with Mexico, by congressional district, 2010
(sorted by state and congressional district)

State	Congressional district	Net jobs displaced	Total district employment**	Share of district employment
New York	17	800	298,200	0.27%
New York	18	1,100	318,400	0.35%
New York	19	1,300	335,100	0.39%
New York	20	1,300	336,000	0.39%
New York	21	900	323,500	0.28%
New York	22	1,300	319,300	0.41%
New York	23	900	286,600	0.31%
New York	24	1,200	305,600	0.39%
New York	25	1,600	316,500	0.51%
New York	26	1,800	318,100	0.57%
New York	27	1,400	294,700	0.48%
New York	28	1,200	259,300	0.46%
New York	29	1,900	311,700	0.61%
New York	Statewide	34,300	8,954,600	0.38%
North Carolina	1	600	243,100	0.25%
North Carolina	2	1,300	304,100	0.43%
North Carolina	3	700	290,500	0.24%
North Carolina	4	2,300	384,700	0.60%
North Carolina	5	1,600	321,700	0.50%
North Carolina	6	2,000	331,900	0.60%
North Carolina	7	700	305,800	0.23%
North Carolina	8	1,200	296,300	0.40%
North Carolina	9	1,500	398,300	0.38%
North Carolina	10	1,900	300,900	0.63%
North Carolina	11	1,200	303,900	0.39%
North Carolina	12	1,500	305,400	0.49%
North Carolina	13	1,600	344,700	0.46%
North Carolina	Statewide	18,900	4,132,900	0.46%
North Dakota	Statewide	1,000	336,900	0.30%
Ohio	1	1,000	293,200	0.34%
Ohio	2	1,500	319,100	0.47%
Ohio	3	2,000	295,100	0.68%
Ohio	4	3,400	299,200	1.14%
Ohio	5	3,100	311,200	1.00%
Ohio	6	1,300	268,300	0.48%
Ohio	7	1,700	308,100	0.55%
Ohio	8	2,100	309,900	0.68%
Ohio	9	2,200	287,700	0.76%

Heading South: U.S.-Mexico trade and job displacement after NAFTA

Supplemental Table B
Jobs displaced due to trade deficits with Mexico, by congressional district, 2010
(sorted by state and congressional district)

State	Congressional district	Net jobs displaced	Total district employment**	Share of district employment
Ohio	10	1,700	292,000	0.58%
Ohio	11	1,100	234,800	0.47%
Ohio	12	1,700	349,000	0.49%
Ohio	13	2,000	311,200	0.64%
Ohio	14	1,800	325,200	0.55%
Ohio	15	1,700	329,000	0.52%
Ohio	16	2,000	311,800	0.64%
Ohio	17	2,100	278,800	0.75%
Ohio	18	1,500	287,000	0.52%
Ohio	Statewide	34,900	5,412,100	0.64%
Oklahoma	1	1,900	347,100	0.55%
Oklahoma	2	1,300	288,300	0.45%
Oklahoma	3	1,500	320,000	0.47%
Oklahoma	4	1,400	337,100	0.42%
Oklahoma	5	1,600	334,100	0.48%
Oklahoma	Statewide	7,900	1,626,800	0.49%
Oregon	1	3,000	388,100	0.77%
Oregon	2	900	340,400	0.26%
Oregon	3	1,700	362,300	0.47%
Oregon	4	1,400	325,000	0.43%
Oregon	5	1,400	348,000	0.40%
Oregon	Statewide	8,700	1,764,300	0.49%
Pennsylvania	1	800	236,500	0.34%
Pennsylvania	2	600	237,200	0.25%
Pennsylvania	3	1,500	293,100	0.51%
Pennsylvania	4	1,600	309,200	0.52%
Pennsylvania	5	1,500	287,500	0.52%
Pennsylvania	6	1,700	356,800	0.48%
Pennsylvania	7	1,000	332,400	0.30%
Pennsylvania	8	1,600	339,800	0.47%
Pennsylvania	9	1,300	301,000	0.43%
Pennsylvania	10	1,100	296,700	0.37%
Pennsylvania	11	1,000	308,200	0.32%
Pennsylvania	12	1,400	269,300	0.52%
Pennsylvania	13	1,200	311,500	0.39%
Pennsylvania	14	900	265,700	0.34%
Pennsylvania	15	1,700	341,800	0.50%
Pennsylvania	16	1,600	334,000	0.48%

Heading South: U.S.-Mexico trade and job displacement after NAFTA

Supplemental Table B
Jobs displaced due to trade deficits with Mexico, by congressional district, 2010
(sorted by state and congressional district)

State	Congressional district	Net jobs displaced	Total district employment**	Share of district employment
Pennsylvania	17	1,500	325,300	0.46%
Pennsylvania	18	1,600	319,300	0.50%
Pennsylvania	19	1,700	358,600	0.47%
Pennsylvania	Statewide	26,300	5,825,300	0.45%
Rhode Island	1	1,000	259,500	0.39%
Rhode Island	2	1,000	266,900	0.37%
Rhode Island	Statewide	2,100	526,500	0.40%
South Carolina	1	1,300	377,700	0.34%
South Carolina	2	1,300	352,400	0.37%
South Carolina	3	1,300	305,100	0.43%
South Carolina	4	2,000	336,400	0.59%
South Carolina	5	1,300	310,900	0.42%
South Carolina	6	1,100	267,700	0.41%
South Carolina	Statewide	8,600	1,950,700	0.44%
South Dakota	Statewide	1,200	407,500	0.29%
Tennessee	1	1,600	291,200	0.55%
Tennessee	2	1,900	331,000	0.57%
Tennessee	3	1,400	302,100	0.46%
Tennessee	4	2,100	275,100	0.76%
Tennessee	5	1,900	346,600	0.55%
Tennessee	6	2,800	346,700	0.81%
Tennessee	7	1,900	337,700	0.56%
Tennessee	8	1,400	273,200	0.51%
Tennessee	9	1,000	263,500	0.38%
Tennessee	Statewide	16,400	2,767,900	0.59%
Texas	1	1,500	296,800	0.51%
Texas	2	1,300	336,700	0.39%
Texas	3	4,200	418,200	1.00%
Texas	4	2,100	352,600	0.60%
Texas	5	1,500	319,700	0.47%
Texas	6	1,900	365,300	0.52%
Texas	7	2,900	405,900	0.71%
Texas	8	1,500	321,800	0.47%
Texas	9	1,400	322,900	0.43%
Texas	10	3,200	436,800	0.73%
Texas	11	1,700	294,800	0.58%
Texas	12	2,600	358,300	0.73%
Texas	13	1,100	292,600	0.38%

Heading South: U.S.-Mexico trade and job displacement after NAFTA

Supplemental Table B
Jobs displaced due to trade deficits with Mexico, by congressional district, 2010
 (sorted by state and congressional district)

State	Congressional district	Net jobs displaced	Total district employment**	Share of district employment
Texas	14	1,000	324,100	0.31%
Texas	15	700	256,000	0.27%
Texas	16	1,400	262,700	0.53%
Texas	17	1,100	317,100	0.35%
Texas	18	1,400	292,000	0.48%
Texas	19	800	291,000	0.27%
Texas	20	700	284,200	0.25%
Texas	21	1,800	365,600	0.49%
Texas	22	1,700	403,300	0.42%
Texas	23	1,000	303,800	0.33%
Texas	24	2,600	394,500	0.66%
Texas	25	1,800	377,800	0.48%
Texas	26	2,600	399,900	0.65%
Texas	27	800	272,700	0.29%
Texas	28	1,000	293,500	0.34%
Texas	29	1,100	276,200	0.40%
Texas	30	1,200	288,700	0.42%
Texas	31	2,200	338,100	0.65%
Texas	32	2,000	335,600	0.60%
Texas	Statewide	55,600	10,602,400	0.52%
Utah	1	2,000	405,100	0.49%
Utah	2	1,600	404,500	0.40%
Utah	3	1,700	419,100	0.41%
Utah	Statewide	5,400	1,228,900	0.44%
Vermont	Statewide	1,300	329,700	0.39%
Virginia	1	1,000	356,700	0.28%
Virginia	2	800	303,100	0.26%
Virginia	3	700	287,700	0.24%
Virginia	4	800	335,200	0.24%
Virginia	5	900	297,400	0.30%
Virginia	6	1,300	321,800	0.40%
Virginia	7	1,200	373,500	0.32%
Virginia	8	1,200	381,100	0.31%
Virginia	9	1,500	278,700	0.54%
Virginia	10	1,800	413,100	0.44%
Virginia	11	1,300	389,700	0.33%
Virginia	Statewide	13,100	3,739,700	0.35%
Washington	1	1,700	368,900	0.46%

Heading South: U.S.-Mexico trade and job displacement after NAFTA

Supplemental Table B
Jobs displaced due to trade deficits with Mexico, by congressional district, 2010
(sorted by state and congressional district)

State	Congressional district	Net jobs displaced	Total district employment**	Share of district employment
Washington	2	1,000	340,400	0.29%
Washington	3	1,400	345,400	0.41%
Washington	4	400	309,400	0.13%
Washington	5	1,100	311,900	0.35%
Washington	6	700	293,600	0.24%
Washington	7	1,400	366,400	0.38%
Washington	8	1,800	385,600	0.47%
Washington	9	1,100	328,500	0.33%
Washington	Statewide	10,800	3,051,500	0.35%
West Virginia	1	800	257,700	0.31%
West Virginia	2	1,100	275,500	0.40%
West Virginia	3	600	219,600	0.27%
West Virginia	Statewide	2,600	753,100	0.35%
Wisconsin	1	2,300	359,000	0.64%
Wisconsin	2	1,800	398,900	0.45%
Wisconsin	3	1,700	371,500	0.46%
Wisconsin	4	1,500	286,700	0.52%
Wisconsin	5	2,300	373,600	0.62%
Wisconsin	6	2,000	354,800	0.56%
Wisconsin	7	1,200	347,900	0.34%
Wisconsin	8	1,200	356,100	0.34%
Wisconsin	Statewide	14,500	2,849,100	0.51%
Wyoming	Statewide	1,000	268,800	0.37%
Puerto Rico	Statewide	3,800	1,199,900	0.32%
U.S. plus Puerto Rico*		682,900	141,348,700	0.48%

* Totals vary slightly due to rounding errors.

**Average employment by congressional district in 2005-07. Analysis based on pooled, three-year times series data from the U.S. Census American Community Survey, as described in Scott (2010b, Appendix).

Source: EPI analysis of U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. International Trade Commission, and Bureau of Labor Statistics data